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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. COURT'S APPROACH TO BATsON DECISION REMAINS INCONSISTENT
In State v. Elmore1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
the solicitor's exercise of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors
did not violate the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Batson v.
Kentucky.2 Elmore is the latest in a series of decisions by the South
Carolina Supreme court that addresses the issue of racial discrimina-
tion in peremptory challenges.3 Analysis of Elmore indicates that the
court has not yet established a consistent method of dealing with Bat-
son clarhns.
4
After exhaustive proceedings in the lower courts,5 a jury convicted
Edward Lee Elmore of murder, burglary, and criminal sexual conduct.
In a separate sentencing trial, another jury sentenced him to death.
Elmore appealed the sentence and contended that the solicitor violated
Batson by striking two black prospective jurors.6
In Batson the United States Supreme Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors
from striking jurors solely because of their race.7 The Court established
1. 300 S.C. 130, 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2633 (1990).
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. See State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E.2d 891 (1989); State v. Howard, 295
S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174 (1989); State v. Jones, 293
S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987); State v. Smith, 293 S.C. 22, 358 S.E.2d 389 (1987).
4. See Case Comment, State's Use of Peremptory Strikes Made More Difficult to
Challenge on Grounds of Racial Discrimination, 41 S.CL. REV. 39 (1988) (critical analy-
sis of State v. Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174
(1989)).
5. The supreme court reversed Elmore's original convictions and sentence. State
v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983). Subsequently, the court affirmed his
second conviction and sentence. State v. Elmore, 286 S.C. 70, 332 S.E.2d 762 (1985).
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded his case for re-
consideration in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In a third sentenc-
ing trial, a jury once again sentenced Elmore to death. State v. Elmore, 300 S.C. 130, 386
S.E.2d 769 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2633 (1990).
6. The final jury consisted of eleven whites and one black. The solicitor accepted
the first black presented and seated another black as an alternate. Elmore also raised
four other issues on appeal: (1) error in refusal to disqualify a juror for cause, (2) error in
refusal to replace a juror with an alternate juror, (3) error in refusal to allow introduction
of evidence that Elmore's case was inadequately investigated, and (4) error in allowing
certain portions of the solicitor's closing argument. Elmore, 300 S.C. at 132, 386 S.E.2d
at 770.
7. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
1
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the rule that, upon a prima facie showing of discrimination,' the state
has the burden of "com[ing] forward with a neutral explanation for
challenging black jurors."9 The Court declined "to formulate particular
procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a
prosecutor's challenges"' 0 and relied instead upon the state and federal
trial courts to apply the standard."
The trial judge in Elmore determined that the defendant had not
established a prima facie showing of discrimination. 2 Relying on Bat-
son, Elmore argued that evidence of several strikes against potential
jurors in the venire is sufficient for the trial court to conclude that a
criminal defendant~has established a prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation." Case law, however, supported the trial judge's determination
that the number of strikes alone does not constitute prima facie dis-
crimination."1 Accordingly, the supreme court found that the trial
judge had not abused his discretion.k5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Finney presented Elmore's strong-
est argument that showed prima facie discrimination." Justice Finney
wrote that the solicitor's disparate questioning of potential jurors es-
tablished a case of prima facie discrimination. In particular, he noted
that the solicitor subjected black jurors to more rigorous questioning
than white jurors. 7 To support his assertion, Justice Finney compared
8. A defendant can establish prima facie discrimination in the following way: (1)
"show[ing] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group ... and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defend-
ant's race"; (2) by relying on the fact that "peremptory challenges constitute a jury selec-
tion practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate' ";
and (3) by showing that "these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference
that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race." Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
9. Id. at 97.
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id. at 99 n.24.
12. 300 S.C. at 132, 386 S.E.2d at 770.
13. Brief of Appellant at 2.
14. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 293 S.C. 22, 358 S.E.2d 389 (1987) (court found no
abuse of discretion when state exercised two of five strikes to remove two black jurors
and final jury contained four black jurors); see also United States v. Young-Bey, 893
F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1990) (peremptory challenge of two of six blacks does not strongly
suggest discrimination); United States v. Fuller, 887 F.2d 144, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1989)
(cannot rely solely on the exclusion of two out of five potential black jurors), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 2592 (1990); United States v. Ingram, 839 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8th Cir. 1988)
(striking black juror alone does not establish a prima facie case under Batson); United
States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1987) (no prima facie case when
government used two of six peremptory strikes to eliminate half of black veniremen).
15. Elmore, 300 S.C. at 132, 386 S.E.2d at 770.
16. Id. at 135, 386 S.E.2d at 771-75 (Finney, J., dissenting).
17. Id., 386 S.E.2d at 771.
[Vol. 42
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the volume (in pages of trial transcript) and the context of questions
asked of black jurors with those of white jurors."8
The majority dismissed Justice Finney's argument stating: "The
voir dire of the 41 persons drawn must be viewed in its entirety. It
must not be considered with focus upon three isolated examples." 19 Al-
though striking black jurors alone is insufficient to establish prima fa-
cie discrimination, the additional consideration of disparate question-
ing seems to meet the "inference" of discrimination mandated by
Batson.20 Why then did the supreme court not find prima facie dis-
crimination in Elmore?
If the court had found prima facie discrimination in the solicitor's
questions, then in future cases, if solicitors asked too many questions
of a black juror, this might establish prima facie discrimination. More-
over, if solicitors ask too few questions, they might be accused of "des-
ultory or half-hearted questioning which can indicate the government's
intent to strike black people regardless of their answers.
'21 Must solici-
tors subject all jurors to the same questions, whether they feel it is
necessary or not, simply to avoid a Batson claim? In United States v.
Grandison the Fourth Circuit stated:
We refuse to require the government to ask follow-up questions to
every stricken venireman during voir dire in order to defeat a Batson
challenge. A balance must be struck between fair jury selection proce-
dures and the need to move promptly toward trial. The decision not
to ask follow-up questions is a matter of trial strategy; failure to do so
is not dispositive of the thoughtfulness of the prosecution's exercise of
its peremptory strikes.
22
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning can also apply to situations in which
solicitors ask follow-up questions to jurors about whom they are un-
sure. Solicitors should not have to ask the same follow-up questions to
all jurors. Such a requirement would be inefficient and overly
burdensome.
Although the trial judge decided that Elmore had not established
prima facie discrimination, he still required the solicitor to present a
racially neutral explanation for his strikes.21 The solicitor's primary
reason for the strikes was his reliance upon the advice of two black law
18. Id. at 137-42, 386 S.E.2d at 773-75.
19. Id. at 132, 386 S.E.2d at 770.
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2178 (1990).
22. Id.
23. Elmore, 300 S.C. at 133, 386 S.E.2d at 770.
1990]
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enforcement officials, 24 although it is not clear what advice these two
officials gave to the solicitor.25 Despite the apparent insufficiency of the
solicitor's reason for striking the black jurors, the supreme court did
not question it in the majority opinion. Justice Finney pointed out in
dissent, "Allowing the solicitor to articulate the advice of others as the
basis of a neutral explanation leaves the Equal Protection Clause de-
void of substance.
'28
The solicitor gave his second reason for the challenges, the black
jurors' beliefs on the death penalty, only after being prompted by the
trial judge.27 A juror's opposition to the death penalty may be a valid
race-neutral reason to strike that juror, but only If the solicitor applies
the criteria consistently to both blacks and whites. 2 The supreme
court articulated this standard in State v. Oglesby29 when it found
that, even though the reason for striking blacks was neutral, the incon-
sistent application of the reason negated its validity.30
Elmore argued that because the solicitor had not challenged two
white jurors with similar views he negated the race-neutral reason.31
The court, however, stated that "the Solicitor presented a racially neu-
tral explanation for challenging the two black jurors, to wit, their vacil-
lating responses to his questions regarding the death penalty."3 2 The
court never questioned that a juror's opposition to the death penalty
constituted a sufficient race-neutral reason. The critical issue was
whether the solicitor applied the criteria evenly to both races.
The supreme court's opinion in Elmore provides little guidance for
solicitors faced with a Batson challenge, which is virtually automatic
whenever a black defendant is on trial. The court surprisingly accepted
the solicitor's argument that he had relied on the advice of others.
There remains no standard method in South Carolina for dealing with
Batson claims.
Stephen E. Bondura
24. See id. at 137, 386 S.E.2d at 772.
25. Neither the supreme court's opinion nor the trial record reveals exactly the
advice given.
26. 300 S.C. at 137, 386 S.E.2d at 773 (Finney, J. dissenting).
27. Brief of Respondent at 2.
28. See Case Comment, supra note 4, at 45-46 (analysis of this issue in State v.
Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 369 S.E.2d 132 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3174 (1989)).
29. 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E.2d 891 (1989).
30. Id. at 281, 379 S.E.2d at 892 (state struck three black females because they
were patients of doctor, then allowed a white patient to serve on the jury).
31. Brief of Respondent at 6.
32. Elmore, 300 S.C. at 133, 386 S.E.2d at 770.
[Vol. 42
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II. TECHNICALLY DEFECTIVE SUMMONS MAY CONFER JURISDICTION
ABSENT SHOWING OF PREJUDICE
In Wham v. Shearson-Lehman Bros.3 3 the South Carolina Court
of Appeals held that omission of certain language recommended in the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) for inclusion in a
summons3 4 does not render a challenged summons defective unless the
defendant can show prejudice.
Shearson-Lehman Brothers, Inc. (Shearson) failed to answer
Wham's complaint within the period prescribed by the SCRCP.
Thirty-eight days after service of the complaint, the Anderson County
Clerk of Court entered a default judgment against Shearson. At
Wham's request, the master in equity scheduled a default hearing and
notified Shearson.
3 5
Shearson appeared and moved to quash the summons and to set
aside the clerk's entry of a default judgment. The company alterna-
tively asked the master to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.
Shearson conceded its neglect when it failed to request an extension
from Wham, but argued that the master should excuse it. Shearson
had been burdened with work from the October 1987 stock market
crash and increased litigation as a result of the company's merger with
E. F. Hutton. The master, however, denied Shearson's motion to quash
the summons, and refused to set aside the default judgment because
the the company did not sustain its burden of proof on excusable neg-
lect. The master also denied Shearson's motion to compel arbitration."'
The South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed two of the three
issues that Shearson raised on appeal. Shearson alleged that. Wham's
summons was fatally defective. Wham had notified Shearson in its
summons that if the company should fail to answer in a timely man-
ner, "the plaintiff in this action will apply to the court for the relief
33. 298 S.C. 462, 381 S.E.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1989). The South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the Wham opinion in Jordan v. Darrah, 300 S.C. 401, 388 S.E.2d 639
(1990) (trial judge had found the summons irregular and the supreme court found it
sufficient based on Wham).
34. S.C.R. Civ. P. 4(b). The rule provides that:
The summons shall be signed by the plaintiff or his attorney, contain the name
of the state and county, the name of the court, the fie number of the action,
and the names of the parties, be directed to the defendant, state the name and
address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, otherwise the plaintiff's address, and
the time within which these rules require the defendant to appear and defend,
and shall notify him that in case of his failure to do so judgement [sic] by
default will be rendered against him for the relief demanded in the complaint.
Id. (emphasis added).
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demanded in the complaint. 37 In the summons Wham failed to in-
struct Shearson that in the event of default, a judgment would be en-
tered against the company, and Shearson argued that this simple omis-
sion defeated the complaint because rule 4(b) instructs counsel to
include a notice of default judgment.38 In Shearson's view, therefore, a
nonconforming summons would be insufficient to confer jurisdiction
over a defendant.
The court of appeals rejected the argument that a party must fol-
low the language in rule 4(b). The court instead looked at whether the
summons misled the defendant. In Wham the court ruled that the
"summons [was] sufficiently accurate to provide proper notice to
Shearson Lehman... that judgment by default will be taken against
Shearson Lehman should it fail to appear and defend the action."30
SCRCP 4(i) permits a party to amend a summons "unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial
rights of the party against whom the process is issued. '40 When the
court found that the summons did not mislead Shearson, it applied the
rule 4(i) test. It is appropriate for the court to require the defendant to
show prejudice when the defaulting party is represented by counsel
and the possibility that the defendant will be confused is minimal. The
Wham court ruled that the defendant was aware of its duty to re-
spond. The court noted that "the omission of the language from the
37. Id., 381 S.E.2d at 500-01. The language in Wham's complaint was similar to
that found in an early edition of a South Carolina form book. See H. LIGHTSEY, JR. & J.
FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE, app. B, form II at 7 (S.C. Bar 1985 &
Supp. 1988). This form book was revised to include the language that a "judgment by
default will be rendered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint" after at
least one trial court held that notice of a default judgment was mandatory and the fail-
ure to include sufficient language rendered the summons irregular. See id. at Supp. 14.
38. See S.C.R. Civ. P. 4(b).
39. 298 S.C. at 464, 381 S.E.2d at 501. For a similar analysis see 4A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 31-32 (1987) (discussing summons form
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b), which is substantially identical to South
Carolina rule 4(b)). South Carolina common law historically has followed the same rea-
soning. In Chamberlain v. Bittersohm, 48 F. 42 (C.C.S.C. 1891) the court granted the
plaintiff leave to amend an irregular summons. The court held that the defendant was
not surprised because the complaint was attached to the summons and the defendant
knew "exactly the nature of the wrong with which he [was] charged. He cannot have
been misled or injured by the erroneous assertion that, on his failure to answer, judg-
ment would be taken against him." Id. at 43.
40. S.C.R. Civ. P. 4(i). The rule provides that:
At any time in its discretion and upon terms as it deems just, the court may,
by written order, allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended,
unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial
rights of the party against whom the process issued.
Id. As early as 1847, amendment of process was granted to correct clerical error. See
Wilson v. Pyles, 32 S.C.L. (1 Strob.) 357 (1847).
[Vol. 42
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summons was harmless ... [and] had nothing whatever to do with
Shearson Lehman's failure to appear and defend the action and it
neither confused nor misled Shearson Lehman.
4 1
A summons must provide adequate notice to a defendant of the
pending lawsuit and that he is required to make an appearance.42 The
court recognized that Wham's summons met these requirements when
it ruled that as long as Shearson could respond properly to the process,
the summons fulfilled its purpose.
4 3
The court did not need to reach the question whether the specifi-
cations of rule 4(b) are mandatory. In South Carolina "[a] general ap-
pearance constitutes a voluntary submission to the'jurisdiction of the
court and waives any defects and irregularities in the service of pro-
cess." 44 When a defendant requests relief from the court, the court may
grant relief only if the court has jurisdiction and the defendant has
made a general appearance." When Shearson asked the master to set
aside the entry of default judgment, it made a general appearance.
Therefore, Shearson waived its right to object to the defective sum-
mons. By reaching the summons question, the court resolved the ten-
sion between the seemingly inconsistent provisions of SCRCP 4(b) and
4(i). This is the correct result. If the requirements of rule 4(b) had
been deemed compulsory, the amendment provisions of rule 4(i) would
not be necessary.
The court of appeals remanded Wham on the grounds that the
master erroneously applied the strict excusable neglect standard of
41. 298 S.C. at 463, 381 S.E.2d at 501 (problems within Shearson's legal depart-
ment and not the language in the summons caused defendant's failure to respond).
42. See, e.g., Crawford v. Murphy, 260 S.C. 411, 415, 196 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1973);
Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. 147, 153, 169 S.E.2d 387, 390 (1969); Beard-
Laney, Inc. v. Darby, 208 S.C. 313, 318, 38 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1946); see also 4A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 39,.at 31-32 (treatment of notice requirement under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
43. The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that a summons which indicated a
copy of the complaint was forthcoming was confusing and misleading because the de-
fendants "had the right to assume... that they did not have to answer the complaint in
the action until a copy thereof was served upon them." Crawford v. Murphy, 260 S.C.
411, 415, 196 S.E.2d 503, 504 (1973). The supreme court also has quashed a summons
because an "[e]rror on the part of the plaintiff's counsel in serving a summons which did
not comply with the statute was obviously a factor contributing to the default." Brown v.
Weathers, 251 S.C. 67, 72-73, 160 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1968).
44. Stickland v. Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 274 S.C. 554, 555, 265 S.E.2d 682,
683 (1980).
45. See, e.g., Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc., 283 S.C. 210, 213-14, 321 S.E.2d 179,
181 (Ct. App. 1984) (general appearance submits party to the jurisdiction of the court);
Stickland, 274 S.C. at 556, 265 S.E.2d at 683 (general appearance constituted waiver of
claim and defects in service of summons).
1990]
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SCRCP 60(b) to Shearson's motion to vacate the entry of default.46
The court acknowledged that the excusable neglect standard should be
applied only when a default judgment is rendered by judicial order.
The court reiterated the South Carolina practice thatto obtain relief
from an entry of default judgment, the defaulting party needs only to
make a showing of "good cause" pursuant to SCRCP 55(c).' 7 A trial
judge may interpret liberally rule 55(c) because "it [is] clear the party
requesting a judgment by default is not entitled to one as of right, even
when the defendant is technically in default."' 8 To determine if Shear-
son had good cause, the court of appeals in Wham instructed the
master to consider the following factors: "(1) the timing of Shearson
Lehman's motion for relief; (2) whether Shearson Lehman has a meri-
torious defense; and (3) the degree of prejudice to Wham if relief is
granted." 9
The court of appeals declined to address Shearson's alternative
motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. Interestingly,
the court remarked that a party must raise an arbitration agreement as
an affirmative defense and the failure to do so could result in a waiver
of the right to arbitrate. The court's observation that a party must
raise arbitration as an affirmative defense, however, may be contrary to
recent cases which hold that "[w]aiver is not easily presumed in light
of the'strong federal policy favoring arbitration.inio
Deborah P. Morgan
46. S.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule in pertinent part provides: "On motion and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for... mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. . . ." Id.
47. S.C.R. Civ. P. 55(c). The rule provides: "For good cause shown the court may
set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may like-
wise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." Id.
48. Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C. 372, 375, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1987)
(citation omitted).
49. Wham, 298 S.C. at 465, 381 S.E.2d at 502.
50. Rodriguez Font v. Paine Webber, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D.P.R. 1986)
(citation omitted); see also Fraser v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 817
F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1987) (party that objects to arbitration must show that delay has
caused actual prejudice); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1985)
(participation in litigation results in waiver of right to arbitrate only when prejudice to
other party is demonstrated); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp.
1505, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (mere delay in asserting right to arbitrate will not justify a
finding of waiver absent a showing of prejudice).
[Vol. 42
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III. FEDERAL INTEREST RATE APPLIES WHEN AWARDING
POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY ACTIONS
In Forest Sales Corp. v. Bedingfield51 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the federal interest rate,52 rather than the rate set by
state statute,5" applies to awards of postjudgment interest in federal
diversity actions. This decision is consistent with the purpose of the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 5 and with decisions from
courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue.5
In 1982 Forest Sales Corporation sued Walter Bedingfield and Ru-
fus McLarty (collectively "Bedingfield") for the balance owed on a
trade account that Bedingfield personally guaranteed, and for interest
and attorney's fees. In 1985 Bedingfield confessed judgment for the
principal amount of nearly $100,000. The court awarded Forest pre-
judgment attorney's fees of $30,000 and prejudgment interest.5
In September 1987 Forest moved for postjudgment interest and
attorney's fees. Bedingfield requested a ruling on whether the appro-
priate rate for postjudgment interest should be determined by state or
by federal law. A federal magistrate held that postjudgment interest
should be paid at the federal rate.57 The district court affirmed the
magistrate's order in October 1988. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding that postjudgment interest should
be paid at the rate established by federal law. 8
The court rejected two arguments advanced by Forest. First, For-
est argued that the state statute applied because, according to the Erie
doctrine, 59 federal courts should interpret federal statutes narrowly
when the federal statute conflicts with state substantive law. Second,
Forest argued that if Congress had intended the 1982 amendment to
the statute that governed federal postjudgment interest 0 to apply to
51. 881 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1989).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-31-20(B) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
54. See Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 302(e), 96 Stat. 25, 55-56 (1982).
55. See Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 622-25 (5th
Cir. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Transport Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (7th Cir.
1988); Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., 842 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1988); Ever-
aard v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 1186, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1988); Bai-
ley v. Chattem, Inc., 838 F.2d 149, 155 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988);
G.M. Brod & Co. v. United States Home Corp., 759 F.2d 1526, 1542 (10th Cir. 1988);
Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan Carpet, Inc., 723 F.2d 1382, 1385-87 (8th Cir. 1983).
56. Forest, 881 F.2d at 111 (4th Cir. 1989).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
59. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988). Prior to the 1982 amendment this statute read: "In-
1990]
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diversity cases, it would have stated that explicitly. 1 The Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected these arguments based on the Eight Circuit's analysis in
Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan Carpet, Inc.62 and the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc.
63
The Forest court noted that "Weitz provides a detailed rationale
for ruling that Erie does not require that state law determine postjudg-
ment interest .... ,,"4 The court then quoted the Weitz court's analy-
sis: "[postjudgment interest] is . . . easily susceptible of characteriza-
tion as 'procedural,' since it has to do exclusively with events that
occur after a dispute gets to court."65 The Forest court agreed with the
Weitz court that when the rights at issue are capable of rational classi-
fication as either procedural or substantive, "Congress has. full power
to legislate, even as to cases that get into the federal courts only be-
cause of diversity of citizenship." ' Although the Weitz court discussed
Congress' power to regulate procedure in the federal courts, 7 the For-
est court examined the substantive instead of the procedural part of
the Weitz court's analysis. Consequently, the Forest opinion, though in
line with Weitz, is less thorough.
In another line of analysis, the Forest court, again quoting Weitz,
indicated as follows:
The same result follows if the Erie question is analyzed under the
'primary private activity' standard ... On this view, in diversity
cases state law will govern those issues that relate to the parties' pri-
mary out-of-court conduct. The theory is that people plan their busi-
terest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district
court.. . . Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment,
at the rate allowed by State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1948) (amended 1982). The 1982
amendment changed the wording of the original statute by providing that postjudgment
interest was to be calculated "at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent ... of
the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States
Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment" rather than at the
rate allowed by state law. Id. (1982).
61. Forest Sales Corp., 881 F.2d at 112.
62. 723 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1W83).
63. 848 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1988).
64. Forest, 881 F.2d at 112.
65. Id. (quoting Weitz, 723 F.2d at 1386).
66. Id.
67. Prior to concluding that postjudgment interest "is therefore- a subject with re-
spect to which Congress has full power to legislate," Weitz Co., 723 F.2d at 1386, the
Weitz court not only did a Hanna v. Plumer substantive procedural analysis, but also
examined Congress' constitutional power to pass a law fixing a rate of interest on judg-
ments entered by federal courts. Id.; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna is
the leading authority on how a court determines which law, state or federal, should be
applied in diversity cases. Hanna stands for the proposition that federal courts sitting in
diversity should apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.
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ness conduct, in most instances, against a background of substantive
rules of law created by state statutes or court decisions. A rule speci-
fying the rate of interest that a judgment will bear is clearly outside
this category.8
The Forest court's rationale on this point, adopted from Weitz, is
probably unnecessary. Rather than doing a partial Erie analysis or a
"primary private activity" analysis, the court should have either
adopted the Weitz opinion in full or should have performed its own
analysis, following the procedure recently set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.69
In Stewart the Supreme Court held that a district court sitting in
diversity "must apply a federal statute that controls the issue before
the court and that represents a valid exercise of Congress' constitu-
tional powers. ' 70 Under a Stewart analysis the court must first deter-
mine whether a statute is "sufficiently broad to control the issue before
the Court."'1 If the court decides this requirement is satisfied,
it proceeds to inquire whether the statute represents a valid exercise
of Congress' authority under the Constitution. If Congress intended to
reach the issue before the district court, and if it enacted its intention
into law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that is the end
of the matter; "[flederal courts are bound to apply rules enacted by





Applying this analysis to Forest, it appears that section 1961(a) is
"sufficiently broad" to control the issue of the proper interest rate.7 3
The statute clearly addresses the rate of postjudgment interest to be
paid on judgments in diversity cases.
The statute's legislative history does not indicate that Congress in-
68. Forest Sales Corp., 881 F.2d at 112-13 (quoting Weitz, 723 F.2d at 1386). The
"primary private activity" standard refers to the standard, adopted by Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Hanna, to govern choice of law in diversity actions. Hanna, 380
U.S. at 474-75.
69. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). The Stewart case, like Weitz and Forest, addressed the
issue of when a federal statute should be applied to a state cause of action heard by a
federal court sitting in diversity. The Stewart court's analysis is similar to that in Weitz.
The advantage that would have been gained if the Forest court had based its opinion on
Stewart stems solely from the fact that Stewart is a Supreme Court decision which pro-
vides a clear process to follow to determine the applicability of a federal statute in diver-
sity cases.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Id. at 26 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980)).
72. Id. at 27 (quoting Prima Print Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
406 (1967) (citations omitted)).
73. See supra note 60.
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tended to exclude diversity actions. In fact, a Senate Report on the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, indicates that section
1961(a) "eliminates an economic incentive which exists today for a los-
ing defendant to appeal a judgment and accumulate interest on the
judgment award at the commercial rate during the pendency of the
appeal." 4 This legislative purpose is served by applying the statue not
only to federal question cases, but also to diversity cases. Thus, both
the statutory language and the legislative history indicate that the
statute applies in Forest.
Because the court of appeals concluded that the statute applied to
the issue in Forest, the court's next step in a Stewart analysis would be
to determine whether the law is a constitutional exercise of Congres-
sional power.75 The constitutional authority of Congress to enact sec-
tion 1961(a) has not been seriously questioned. The United States Su-
preme Court made clear in Hanna v. Plumer74 that:
[T]he constitutional provision for a federal court system ... carries
with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and
pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between sub-
stance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
either.7
Section 1961(a) may be classified as a procedural rule."8 Thus, it may
be subject to congressional control because "Congress has undoubted
power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts. . .. "I'
Although the Forest court correctly concluded that the federal in-
terest rate applies to awards of postjudgment interest in diversity ac-
tions, a different approach may have provided a better analysis. Rather
than relying on the analyses of other circuit courts, the Forest court
74. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-21 (1982). Under preamendment law,
the interest rate on any money judgment recovered in a district court was calculated at
the rate allowed by state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1952). Rates set by states frequently
fell below the federal interest rates enticing defendants to invest funds owed to the
plaintiff while the case was on appeal. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 11-12
(1982).
75. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32.
76. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
77. Id. at 472.
78. A rule is a procedural rule if it "really regulates procedure,- the judicial pro-
cess for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly adminis-
tering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). A second reason "postjudgment interest is better characterized as
procedural [is] because it confers no right in and of itself. Rather, it merely follows and
operates on the substance of determined rights." Nissho-Iwai Co., v. Occidental Crude
Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 1988).
79. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9.
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might have applied the Supreme Court's recently articulated two-step
analysis to determine whether to apply a federal statute in a diversity
case.
Tracy Askew Meyers
IV. BATSON RESTRICTIONS ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES Do NOT
APPLY TO CIVIL CASES BETWEEN PRIVATE LITIGANTS
In 1986 the United States Supreme Court held in Batson v. Ken-
tucky80 that the prosecutor in a criminal case could not exercise pe-
remptory challenges to potential jurors in a racially discriminatory
manner. In Chavous v. Browns' the South Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to extend this limitation to civil actions between private parties.
The issue arose in a suit resulting from an automobile collision
between a black plaintiff and a white defendant. Of the seventy-five
potential jurors on the petit jury list, fifteen were black and sixty were
white. The final panel of twenty contained four blacks. When the de-
fendant's attorney used his peremptory challenges to remove all four
blacks, the plaintiffs counsel objected to the challenges and requested
a Batson hearing, alleging that the challenges were racially motivated.
Defendant's counsel then offered his reasons for striking the four
blacks. The trial judge overruled the plaintiff's objection and held that
Batson did not apply to a civil case. The trial judge further held that
even if Batson did apply, the defendant's reasons were racially neutral
and satisfied the equal protection requirements of Batson. The jury
returned a verdict for the white defendants. 2
The .plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial judge's failure to
sustain his objection to the strikes had resulted in a violation of the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.83 On appeal
80. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits a state prosecutor in a criminal case from exercising pe-
remptory challenges to strike prospective jurors "solely on account of their race or on the
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's
case against a black defendant." Id. at 89. The South Carolina Supreme Court conse-
quently formulated a "bright line test" to determine when a Batson hearing is necessary.
Once a criminal defendant makes the necessary showing, the burden shifts to the prose-
cutor to provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. See State v. Jones, 293
S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
81. - S.C. - 396 S.E.2d 98 (1990).
82. Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 399, 385 S.E.2d 206, 207 (Ct. App. 1989), rev'd,
- S.C. -_., 396 S.E.2d 98 (1990).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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the court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that Batson ap-
plies to a civil case between two private litigants, that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case that the defendant had exercised his pe-
remptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, and that the
defendant had not demonstrated that his reasons for striking the ju-
rors were racially neutral.8 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals, holding that Batson did not apply to this
civil action because there was no state action sufficient to constitute an
equal protection violation. 5
The supreme court used a two-part analysis under Lugar v. Ed-
monson Oil Co.8 "to determine whether the alleged discriminatory
conduct is fairly attributable to the State for equal protection pur-
poses.11 The supreme court found that the first step of the Lugar
analysis, that the deprivation must arise from the exercise of some
state-created right or privilege, 8 was satisfied because the right to ex-
ercise a peremptory challenge arises from the South Carolina Code.89
The court, however, concluded that the second part of the Lugar test
had not been met. The second part of the test requires that "the party
charged with discrimination must be a person who may fairly be con-
sidered a state actor either because he is a state official, or he acted
together with or obtained significant aid from state officials, or his con-
duct is otherwise chargeable to the State." 90
In concluding that no state action existed, the supreme court de-
termined that neither the private attorney's exercise of his peremptory
challenges nor the trial judge's refusal to sustain the plaintiff's objec-
tion constituted state action for equal protection purposes. Although
the court characterized the issue as "whether the exercise of peremp-
tory strikes by a private attorney in a civil case qualifies as state ac-
tion," 91 the court focused primarily on the trial judge's role in permit-
ting peremptory strikes. Viewing the trial judge's involvement as
ministerial rather than discretionary, the court found no exercise of the
state's, coercive power, and, consequently, no state action.92 On this
84. Chavous, 299 S.C. at 406, 385 S.E.2d at 211.
35. - S.C. at .., 396 S.E.2d at 98. The court expressly reserved the question for
cases in which the state is a party to a civil suit. Id. at - n.2, 396 S.E.2d at 98 n.2.
86. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
87. - S.C. at -, 396 S.E.2d at 99.
88. Id. at -, 396 S.E.2d at 99 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
89. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1050 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
90. - S.C. at --, 396 S.E.2d at 99 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937).
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)). In Blum the United States
Supreme Court stated:
[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such
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point the court rejected the argument based on Shelley v. Kraemer3
"[t]hat the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment.""" The supreme court distinguished
Shelley by pointing out that in Chavous "[t]here is no active interven-
tion of the court's discretionary power in the seating of otherwise qual-
ified jurors" and that "there is no court approval of the basis of the
strike needed to obtain the juror's excusal.' 9 5 The court added, how-
ever, that its"conclusion regarding state action would be decidedly dif-
ferent if the trial court excused a juror for cause solely because of his
or her race." 96
The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals'
conclusion, made in light of Tulsa Professional Collection Services,
Inc. v. Pope,97 that the trial judge's "involvement in the [jury] selec-
tion process is substantial enough to be considered 'state action' sub-
ject to the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment." ' The South Car-
olina Supreme Court, while conceding that Chavous also involved a
judicial proceeding, distinguished Tulsa Professional Collection Ser-
vices by pointing out that in that case the probate court was involved
only because the party seeking to assert a right under the applicable
statute had to instigate certain probate court proceedings. The su-
preme court reasoned that, by contrast, when a private attorney exer-
cises a peremptory strike, "the trial judge's function is merely to ad-
minister the exercise of a statutory right.'"9 The supreme court felt
that the trial judge's role was similar to a court's function in adminis-
significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law
be deemed that of the State. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initia-
tives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible
for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004-05 (citations omitted).
93. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
94. - S.C. at -, 396 S.E.2d at 100 (Finney, J., dissenting) (quoting Shelley, 334
U.S. at 14).
95. Id. at -, 396 S.E.2d at 99. Indeed, in framing the issue for decision, the court
referred to hornbook law from Shelley that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." Id. at - n.1,
396 S.E.2d at 98 n.I (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13).
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
97. 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate court's involvement in probate proceedings was so
"pervasive and substantial" that it constituted state action).
98. Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 402, 385 S.E.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1989) (cit-
ing Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., 485 U.S. at 487). The court of appeals listed
the various ways a trial judge is "inextricably involved" in the process: "The judge con-
ducts voir dire. He may excuse jurors from sitting on a particular case. Ultimately, he
determines constitutional challenges to the jury." Id.
99. - S.C. at --, 396 S.E.2d at 100.
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tering a self-executing statute of limitations, a function that the United
States Supreme Court held in Tulsa Professional Collection Services
was not state action.
100
Finally, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the view that
without "something more" a private attorney who exercises peremp-
tory challenges pursuant to a statute becomes a state actor. 1 ' The
court buttressed its position by citing Polk County v. Dodson,'02 a case
in which the United States Supreme Court held that a public defender
representing an indigent defendant was not a state actor.
The supreme court referred to a disagreement among the federal
circuits about whether a trial judge's action in these circumstances
constitutes state action.103 The court of appeals, in finding state action,
quoted favorably from the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion in Fludd v.
Dykes:
The trial judge's decision-to proceed to trial, over the party's objec-
tion, with a jury selected from the venire on the basis of race-is the
one that harms the objecting party. In overruling the objection, which
informed the court that the peremptory challenger may be excluding
blacks from the venire on account of their race, the judge becomes
guilty of the sort of discriminatory conduct that the equal protection
clause proscribes.'
The supreme court, on the other hand, agreed with the position taken
by the Fifth Circuit in its en banc rehearing in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.'05 that the trial judge's action in these circumstances is
not state action for equal protection analysis.
The supreme court distinguished between the ministerial acts and
100. 485 U.S. at 485-86. See also Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970) (no state
action in allowing a reversion clause within a will to operate, closing down a city pool
recently opened to blacks).
101. - S.C. at ---, 396 S.E.2d at 100 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 939 (1982)).
102. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-
55 (1974) (action of a regulated industry is not state action).
103. Compare Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (no state
action) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990), with Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822
(l1th Cir.)(held to be state action), reh'g denied, 873 F.2d 300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 201 (1989).
104. 299 S.C. at 401 n.2, 385 S.E.2d at 208 n.2 (quoting Fludd, 863 F.2d 822, 828
(11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 873 F.2d 300 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 201 (1989).
The Fludd court, in turn, based its decision on the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880): "[A] State acts by its legislative, its
executive, or its judicial authorities." Id. (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347
(1879) (emphasis in original)).
105. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990). The Ed-
monson decision contains excellent presentations of both viewpoints on this issue.
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the discretionary acts of a trial judge when it determined whether the
trial judge's acts should be attributed to the state.01 Perhaps this di-
chotomy is just a shorthand reference for the distinction between judi-
cial actions which require affirmative judicial involvement as in Shel-
ley, and actions which require merely that the judge not hinder a self-
executing process, as in Tulsa Professional Services. Although the su-
preme court cited Shelley for the proposition that the fourteenth
amendment does not prohibit private disciminatory conduct, 107 argua-
bly Shelley commands an opposite result in this case. In Shelley the
United States Supreme Court held that private litigants could not util-
ize judicial processes to enforce racially restrictive covenants.108 Like-
wise, although private counsel committed the allegedly racially moti-
vated behavior in Chavous, the state's judicial system gave it force. On
the other hand, Shelley is distinguishable because the plaintiff in that
case requested the court to enforce a racially restrictive covenant by
taking steps to restrain the purchasers of the property from taking pos-
session and to enter judgment divesting title from the purchaser and
vesting it again in the seller or in some third party of the court's
choice. 0 9 The trial court's action in Chavous, by contrast, is more like
the "mere acquiescence" spoken of in Blum v. Yaretsky.1" 0 If Shelley
stands for the proposition that private litigants are not permitted to
use state-created judicial processes to further private discriminatory
practices, however, this distinction may be without legal significance,
unless Shelley has been limited by Tulsa Professional Collection
Services.
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court disposed of this case
on the basis of lack of state action, it was unnecessary to deal with
several considerations raised by the court of appeals. First, the court of
appeals noted that Batson dealt with peremptory challenges in the
context of a criminal case rather than in a civil case."" Because the
prosecutor is a state agent in a criminal case, the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges constitutes state action, as Batson demon-
strates. The court of appeals recognized that in a civil case, however,
the fact that neither party is identified with the state makes it more
difficult to show that the state, rather than a private individual, was
the source of the discrimination."" Indeed, the distinction between a
criminal case and a civil case was a significant factor in the trial court's
106. - S.C. at -, 396 S.E.2d at 100.
107. Id. at - n.1, 396 S.E.2d at 98 n.1.
108. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
109. Id. at 6.
110. 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
111. Chavous, 299 S.C. at 402, 385 S.E.2d at 209.
112. Id. at 401, 385 S.E.2d at 208.
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decision to overrule the plaintiff's objection. 1 3 The court of appeals,
however, reasoned:
There is no underlying distinction between the function a criminal
jury and a civil jury. One is not more important than the other. Jus-
tice under the law for all parties is the goal of any trial. Racial injus-
tice has no more place in the courtroom on the days the court is con-
ducting civil trials than it does on the days it conducts criminal
trials.
114
Certainly both civil and criminal trials have the same general goal
of "[j]ustice under the law for all parties."'115 But in a criminal trial
because a nameless, impersonal state is prosecuting a personal defend-
ant, the law resolves questions in favor of the defendant. In a civil ac-
tion, however, to the extent the law favors one side, it automatically
places the other litigant at a comparative disadvantage."' A system
that grants one civil litigant, by virtue of membership in a cognizable
racial group, an unrestricted use of peremptory challenges while deny-
ing this privilege to the other side, would call into question the concept
of equal justice under law and would tend to "undermine public confi-
dence in the fairness of our system of justice.
1 7
The court of appeals candidly recognized that critics would claim
that the decision would destroy the peremptory challenge." 8 The Bat-
son Court also foresaw criticism about the diminished vitality of the
peremptory: "[T]his Court has. . . repeatedly stated that the right of
peremptory challenge is not of constitutional magnitude, and may be
withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of
113. Record at 14.
114. Chavous, 299 S.C at 402, 385 S.E.2d at 209. The court viewed this conclusion as
a matter of logic and cited no legal authority. For a case holding that no distinction
exists between civil and criminal trials for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, see Clark v.
City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 894-96 (D. Conn. 1986).
115. Chavous, 299 S.C. at 402, 385 S.E.2d at 209.
116. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 225-26 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
117. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). Batson condemns the assumption
that members of a minority will be unable to render an impartial criminal judgment
about one of their racial peers. On the other hand, Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th
Cir. 1989), quoted favorably by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Chavous, speaks
of an advantage to litigants who have their racial peers on the jury, and "the disadvan-
tage that might result from having no racial peers on the jury." Id. at 825. Cf. Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988) (Gee, J., dissenting) ("To suggest
that a particular race is unfit to judge in any case necessarily is racially insulting. To
suggest that each race may have its own special concerns, or even may tend to favor its
own, is not." Id. at 1316), rev'd en banc, 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
U.S.L.W. - (U.S. May 30, 1990) (No. 89-7743).
118. Chavous, 299 S.C. at 405, 385 S.E.2d at 211.
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impartial jury and fair trial."1 9 Batson seems to require that courts
resolve any conflict between the constitutional right to a fair trial and
the venerable practice of peremptory challenges in favor of the consti-
tutional right.120
A consideration which neither the supreme court nor the court of
appeals addressed is the policy underlying Batson that racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection violates the equal protection rights not only of
the person on trial, but also of the excluded juror. In the introductory
part of its analysis in Batson, the United States Supreme Court spoke
of a history of "unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in
the procedures used to select the venire from which individual jurors
are drawn."' 1 Again, however, because the South Carolina Supreme
Court disposed of this case on the issue of state action, it did not dis-
cuss this policy consideration.
Ordinarily, these various policy considerations require a skillful ac-
commodation of the important goals of eliminating racial bias in jury
selection, ensuring fair treatment of all civil litigants, and maintaining
public confidence in the judicial processes. Nevertheless, traditional
equal protection analysis requires state action, a factor that the South
Carolina Supreme Court held to be absent in this case. Because of the
conflict among the federal circuits and the importance of the issues
involved, however, it is likely that the United States Supreme Court
will provide a clear answer to this question when it hears Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co..
Kendall R. Walker
V. REASONABLE REFUSAL TO CONTINUE DEPOSITION NOT SUBJECT TO
SANCTIONS
In Dunn v. Dunn 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a
119. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). By con-
trast, in a strong dissent Chief Justice Btirger argued that courts have long considered
the peremptory challenge "'one of the most important of the rights' in our justice sys-
tem." Id. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
120. See id. at 98-99.
121. Id. at 86.
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose
life or liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror ulti-
mately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability im-
partially to consider evidence presented at a trial. A person's race simply "is
unrelated to his fitness as a juror."
Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
122. 298 S.C. 499, 381 S.E.2d 734 (1989).
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family court decision to impose sanctions on a party for failure to con-
tinue a deposition. The supreme court held that the lower court's deci-
sion was unreasonable and without factual support. The Dunn opinion
demonstrates the importance of a court's proper use of its discretion
when deciding whether a party's refusal to proceed with a deposition
may be justified under rule 37(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.
123
In Dunn the parties were engaged in a divorce proceeding. During
her deposition, Mrs. Dunn refused to answer questions regarding an
extramarital sexual relationship. Consequently, Mr. Dunn's attorney
recessed the deposition and moved for an order requiring Mrs. Dunn to
answer. During the hearing on this motion, the family court judge
granted the order in the presence of both attorneys and instructed Mr.
Dunn's attorney to draw the order.
124
Mrs. Dunn and her attorney agreed to resume the deposition upon
the express condition that a copy of the signed order be made available
to them before proceeding with the deposition. Mr. Dunn's attorney
came to the deposition without the order and stated that the order
would arrive shortly. Mrs. Dunn, on the advice of her attorney, refused
to resume the deposition until the order arrived. Meanwhile, Mrs.
Dunn's attorney offered to proceed with the depositions of Mrs.
Dunn's parents, which were also scheduled for that afternoon. Mr.
Dunn's attorney refused to alter the deposition schedule or to wait and
left without taking any of the other scheduled depositions.
12 5
Mr. Dunn's attorney then moved for sanctions against Mrs. Dunn
under rule 37(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The
family court judge ordered a sanction of $500 in attorney's fees upon
Mrs. Dunn because he found her refusal to resume the deposition
unreasonable.
1 21
Rule 37(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in-
structs courts to impose sanctions when a party fails to comply with a
discovery order, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or the circumstances make an award of expenses un-
123. See S.C.R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E) which governs sanctions by the court for failure
to comply with an order compelling discovery. The rule states: "[Tihe court shall require
the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the rea-
sonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds
that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust."
124. Dunn, 298 S.C. at 500-01, 381 S.E.2d at 734-35.
125. Id. at 501, 381 S.E.2d at 735.
126. Id. The family court imposed the sanction because Mrs. Dunn's attorney kmew
that the judge had signed the order. See id.
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just.127 A trial judge's decisions on discovery issues will not be dis-
turbed on appeal unless the judge clearly abuses his discretion, 128 and
this results in prejudice to the opposing party's rights, and is therefore,
an error of law.2
In Dunn the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the family
court's imposition of sanctions was a clear abuse of discretion for two
reasons. First, the family court did not investigate whether the attor-
neys had agreed to provide Mrs. Dunn with a copy of the order prior to
resuming the deposition. The supreme court, after reviewing the rec-
ord, determined that the attorneys indeed had made an agreement. 3
Second, the supreme court stated that "[t]o penalize [the] Wife for
reasonably relying upon the advice of her attorney, offered in good
faith, under these circumstances is clearly unjust."13'
Thus, the Dunn opinion defines a circumstance that excuses a
party from failing to obey an order compelling discovery. If the attor-
neys agree that a written order to compel discovery will be available
before resuming a deposition, a client's reliance on counsel's advice not
to continue until the order arrives is reasonable and not subject to
sanctions under rule 37(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Susan E. Ziel
VI. JUDGE DOES NOT HAVE TO INSTRUCT JURY ABOUT PAROLE
ELGIILITY
In State v. Smith"' a divided South Carolina Supreme Court up-
held the validity of the trial judge's supplemental charge in response to
a jury question about parole and the meaning of "life in prison."' s
This holding seems to contradict the court's earlier decision in State v.
Norris.34 In Norris the court established a two-part instruction for
trial judges to give in response to an inquiry from the jury about parole
127. S.C.R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(E).
128. Hook v. Rothstein, 281 S.C. 541, 555, 316 S.E.2d 690, 699 (Ct. App.), cert. de-
nied, 283 S.C. 64, 320 S.E.2d 35 (1984).
129. Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 195, 209 S.E.2d 42, 47 (1974).
130. Dunn, 298 S.C. at 502, 381 S.E.2d at 735.
131. Id. at 503, 381 S.E.2d at 736.
132. 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1536 (1990).
133. During deliberations, the jury sent a note with the question: "What does life in
prison mean (the term specifically regarding parole)?" The trial judge then instructed
the jury that "life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning."
Id. at 489, 381 S.E.2d at 727.
134. 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E.2d 339 (1985).
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eligibility. First, the judge should instruct the jury that "it shall not
consider parole eligibility in reaching its decision,"' 3 5 and second, "the
terms 'life imprisonment' and 'death sentence' should be understood in
their ordinary and plain meaning."'13 In Smith the trial judge disre-
garded the first part of the Norris instruction. Nevertheless, the su-
preme court held the instruction to be valid.1 7
A jury convicted appellant Andrew Smith for the murder of an
elderly couple and sentenced him to death. s38 On appeal, the court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the trial judge's failure to give the com-
plete Norris charge prejudiced Smith. 39 The supreme court deter-
mined that the charge was not prejudicial and that to hold otherwise
would "place form above substance.' ' 40 Justices Chandler and Finney,
in strong dissents, emphatically disagreed with the majority's
reasoning.'
41
The Norris rule evolved from a series of decisions by the supreme
court. In State v. Atkinson142 the supreme court held that the trial
judge properly responded to a jury inquiry about whether the defend-
ant would be eligible for parole or pardon if sentenced to life in prison.
The judge instructed the jury that parole should be of no concern to
them and then briefly referred to the purpose of the parole board to
clarify his point."43 The supreme court, however, hinted that the judge
might have given a clearer instruction, and thus set the stage for
Norris."
In State v. Brooks145 the supreme court stated that "[a] jury
135. Id. at 95, 328 S.E.2d at 344.
136. Id.
137. Smith, 298 S.C. at 487, 381 S.E.2d at 727.
138. The court first affirmed Smith's sentence in State v. Smith, 286 S.C. 406, 334
S.E.2d 277 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031 (1986). Upon application for post convic-
tion relief, the circuit court vacated the death penalty and ordered a new sentencing
proceeding. Once again, Smith received a death sentence.
139. The action consolidated Smith's direct appeal with the sentence review man-
dated by S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
140. Smith, 298 S.C. at 488, 381 S.E.2d at 727 (1989).
141. Id. at 488-90, 381 S.E.2d at 727-28 (Chandler, C.J., dissenting)(Justice Chan-
dler, with Juatice Finney concurring, argued that the partial Norris charge failed to deal
with what the reasonable juror knows, that historically life-term defendants have been
eligible for parole).
142. 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E.2d 111 (1970), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 936 (1972).
143. Id. at 534, 172 S.E.2d at 112.
144. The court hinted that the trial judge could have given a better instruction and
cited a North Carolina Supreme Court decision, State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E.2d
584 (1955). The instruction in Conner included further language that "life imprisonment
means exactly what the statute says: 'imprisonment for life in the State's prison ....
Id. at 471-72, 85 S.E.2d at 587.
145. 271 S.C. 355, 247 S.E.2d 436 (1978).
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should be neither invited nor permitted to speculate upon the possible
effects of parole upon a conviction. 1 46 The court held that the trial
judge's instruction that referred to the accused's parole eligibility con-
stituted reversible error.
147
In State v. Butler"48 the court expressly outlined the circum-
stances in which a judge should address the jury about the parole issue.
Initially, a trial judge is not required to specifically instruct the jury
not to consider the possibility of parole. If the jury later inquires about
parole, however, the judge must then give instructions in accordance
with Atkinson. 49 Thus, the court established the first-part of the Nor-
ris instruction.
Although the court alluded to the second part of the Norris in-
struction in Atkinson, 50 the rule has its roots in State v. Plath.'51 In
Plath the court stated that it was improper for the jury to legislate or
execute a plan of punishment and that the matter of parole 8hould be
determined by a state agency, not the jury. "[T]he jury shall under-
stand the terms 'life imprisonment' and 'death sentence' in their ordi-
nary and plain meaning without elaboration."' 52 Thus, in a capital
case, the jury simply decides the type of sentence and does not concern
itself with whether or how the sentence will be executed. The second
part of the Norris instruction, in theory, prevents the jury from al-
lowing the possibility of parole to influence their decision on whether
the accused should die or receive a life imprisonment sentence.
In Norris the supreme court, following Brooks, Butler, and Plath,
dictated a seemingly concrete rule. In response to an inquiry from the
jury about the possibility of parole, the trial judge must give a two-part
instruction. First, the court must instruct the jury that it shall not con-
sider parole eligibility in reaching its decision, and second, the terms
"life imprisonment" and "death sentence" should be understood in
their ordinary and plain meaning."' The Atkinson instruction, stand-
ing alone, apparently was no longer sufficient.
The court followed its rule in two subsequent decisions: State v.
Johnson'5" and State v. Plemmons.155 During deliberations in Johnson
146. Id. at 359, 247 S.E.2d at 438.
147. Id. at 360, 247 S.E.2d at 439.
148. 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E.2d 420 (1982).
149. Id. at 548, 290 S.E.2d at 422.
150. 253 S.C. 531, 534, 172 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1970).
151. 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
152. Id. at 14, 313 S.E.2d at 627.
153. State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 95, 328 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1985).
154. 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987).
155. 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E.2d 871 (1988).
1990]
23
Bondura et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the jury asked if it could recommend a life sentence without parole. 5 '
Undoubtedly, the jury would sentence the accused to death if it did
not receive assurance that he would really stay in prison for life. The
trial judge instructed the jury only that "the possibility of parole is of
no concern of yours, [sic] and you should not consider whether or not
the Defendant will or will not be paroled.'15 7 The jury sentenced the
defendant to death. The supreme court held that the instruction was
reversible error because the trial judge failed to give the second part of
the Norris charge. s58
Plemmons presented nearly identical circumstances. The trial
judge again did not give the second part of the Norris instruction, and
the jury sentenced the accused to death. The court held that the trial
judge's instruction was reversible error. 5 9 The Norris two-part instruc-
tion appeared to be a firmly established rule.
The facts in State v. Smith were similar to Johnson and Plem-
mons.110 In Smith, however, the trial judge only instructed the jury
that "life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain
meaning."161 The trial judge disregarded the first part of the Norris
instruction, but the court upheld the decision. The supreme court dis-
tinguished Smith by noting that neither Johnson nor Plemmons con-
tained the instruction used by the trial judge in Smith.'6 2 It seems the
supreme court abolished the first part of the Norris rule. Apparently
the second part of the test, now standing alone, will suffice.
The intent of this new application of Norris, however, is not read-
ily apparent in Smith. If the court's goal was to eliminate the possible
prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to consider parole when it decides
to sentence a man to death or to life imprisonment, then Smith does
not further this goal. The court reasoned that "the only logical conclu-
sion available to the reasonable juror if instructed that 'life imprison-
ment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning' was that
the accused would not be eligible for parole.'
6 3
That may be one conclusion, but, as Justice Chandler, noted it
156. 293 S.C. at 327, 360 S.E.2d at 321.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Plemmons, 296 S.C. at 79, 370 S.E.2d at 872.
160. In all three cases the juries returned with questions about the possibility of
parole if the accused was sentenced to life.
161. Smith, 298 S.C. at 487, 381 S.E.2d at 727.
162. Id. The judges' instructions in Johnson and Plemmons contained only the first
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certainly is not the only logical conclusion.1 64 It is virtually common
knowledge today that persons sentenced to life may become eligible for
parole. The term "life imprisonment" is a misnomer and the public is
aware of this. The reasonable juror is just as likely to conclude that the
ordinary meaning of "life imprisonment" is that the accused may be
paroled.
The Norris instruction contains an inherent contradiction when it
is read as a whole. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a jury is
given responsibility to decide the defendant's fate in a capital case. Af-
ter some deliberation they inquire of the court: "If we sentence this
person to life in prison, could he be paroled?" This question provides
some insight into the workings of a capital sentencing jury. First, the
jury clearly is aware of the possibility of parole. Second, it is important
to them and will have some bearing on their decision. Third, the ordi-
nary meaning of "life imprisonment" is not necessarily its literal mean-
ing, as the supreme court in Smith advocates. If it was, the jury would
not have asked the question in the first place.
In response to the question the judge would instruct the jury, ac-
cording to Norris: "Ladies and gentlemen, you are not to consider pa-
role." They are not told that the possibility of parole does not exist
and this may in fact confirm their belief that it does. The judge then
tells them they are to give the term "life imprisonment" its ordinary
and plain meaning. The possibility of parole is common knowledge to a
juror. The juror may wonder whether this is the "ordinary meaning" of
life imprisonment to which the judge referred. He fully realizes the
possibility of parole, but is told not to consider it. Conversely, he is to
consider "life imprisonment' in its ordinary sense, fully realizing that,
ordinarily, prisoners-for-life come up for parole. The court's instruc-
tions have not addressed the jurors' concerns and may have com-
pounded their confusion.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Califor-
nia v. Ramos.16 5 A jury convicted the defendant in Ramosof capital
crimes and sentenced him to death. At the penalty phase of the trial,
the judge instructed the jury that, under state law, "a Governor may in
the future commute or modify a sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would include the possi-
bility of parole. ' 166 On appeal the accused contended that the charge
(referred to as the Briggs Instruction) unconstitutionally invited the
164. Id. at 489, 381 S.E.2d at 728 (Chandler, C.J., dissenting).
165. 463 U.S. 992 (1983), remanded, People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430,
207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985).
166. Id. at 994.
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jury to consider the commutation power in its sentencing decision.167
The Court held that the Briggs Instruction did not violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments."'
The Court recognized that the Briggs Instruction might tend to
focus the jury's attention on the possibility that the system may return
the defendant to society, thus inviting them to "assess whether the de-
fendant is someone whose probable future behavior makes it undesir-
able that he be permitted to return to society."'' 9 The defendant ar-
gued that, due to the speculative nature of inviting the jury to predict
his future behavior, the instruction violated his constitutional rights.
The Court relied on its earlier holding in Jurek v. Texas °70 and held
that a jury may consider a defendant's future dangerousness when it
determines what punishment to impose. The United States Supreme
Court, therefore, -condoned juries contemplating the possibility of
parole.
The Court also addressed whether the Briggs Instruction de-
tracted from the individualized sentencing determination mandated by
the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina.'7' Again the Court relied on
Jurek and concluded that the charge only further ensured that "the
jury will have before it information regarding the individual character-
istics of the defendant and his offense.' 72 The matter is simply one
consideration that enters into the weighing process conducted by the
jury. 17 Thus, the Court implied that speculation about the future con-
duct of the accused is not only valid, but perhaps necessary to conduct
a completely individualized sentencing procedure.
The Supreme Court also recognized and addressed the misleading
potential of the term "life imprisonment without parole" contained in
the Briggs Instruction. The Court noted that, although jurors may gen-
erally be aware of the possibility of parole, the statement is misleading.
It implies that the sentence is permanent, and that is simply false.1 4
The analogy to the South Carolina cases is obvious. The Smith court
held that the charge was sufficient because the only reasonable conclu-
sion for the jury was that the defendant would not receive parole. Re-
167. Id. at 998 n.8.
168. Id. at 1013. The Court, however, explicitly noted that its decision did not over-
ride contrary state courts that hold that it is improper for the jury to consider the possi-
bility of commutation, pardon, or parole. Id. at 1013 n.30.
169. Id. at 1001.
170. Id. at 10Q2-03 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 429 U.S. 875 (1976)).
171. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
172. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1006 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 429 U.S. 875 (1976)), cert. de-
nied, 471 U.S. 1119 (1985).
173. Id. at 1008 n.22.
174. Id. at 1004 n.19.
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gardless of whether the jury believed this or not, the implication was
false. Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court's approach is in-
herently unsettling.
The Supreme Court approved of the fact that the Briggs Instruc-
tion both corrected an inaccurate and misleading statement and sup-
plied the jury with correct information about a possible alternative
consequence of its decision. 7 5 In State v. Brooks1 7 6 the South Carolina
Supreme Court invalidated the trial judge's charge because it improp-
erly informed the jury of the accused's parole eligibility. The trial
judge concluded his instruction with: "I tell you that, Mr. Foreman and
ladies and gentlemen, because that's the way it is and you're entitled
to know it in making your deliberations.117 7 The United States Su-
preme Court would have agreed with the trial judge. 
17
The South Carolina Supreme Court's approach hinges on the in-
terpretation that the legislature mandated a division of responsibility
between the jury and the authorities appointed to carry out the sen-
tence.179 This goal certainly has merit and is sanctioned by the United
States Supreme Court.18 0 Nevertheless, the court's forced application
of this goal on the parole eligibility issue is unrealistic. It is very diffi-
cult to charge a jury that parole eligibility is irrelevant to their deci-
sion. In State v. Johnson'8' the court noted that the jury should base
its decision on the circumstances of the crime and the characteristics of
the defendant.18 2 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
jury's consideration of whether the system should return the accused
to society is a "characteristic of the defendant.' 8 s3 This is a more real-
istic approach. Perhaps the South Carolina Supreme Court is leaning
in this direction.
State v. Atkins"8" provides some insight into where the court is
heading. In Atkins the trial judge gave the jury no instruction at all in
his initial charge about parole eligibility. The appellant asserted that,
175. Id. at 1009.
176. 271 S.C. 355, 247 S.E.2d 436 (1978).
177. Id. at 358, 247 S.E.2d at 438.
178. See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 992.
179. State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 535, 172 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1970), vacated in
part, 408 U.S. 936 (1972). "'The Legislature committed to the jury the responsibility to
determine in the first instance whether punishment should be life or death. It charged
another agency with the responsibility of deciding how a life sentence shall be exe-
cuted.'" Id. (quoting State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 177-78, 142 A.2d 65, 76 (1958)).
180. See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1013 n.30.
181. 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E.2d 317 (1987).
182. Id. at 327, 360 S.E.2d at 321.
183. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1002-05.
184. 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987), vacated sub nom. Patterson v. South Caro-
lina, 110 S. Ct. 709 (1990).
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given the circumstances of the case, the trial judge should have given
an instruction on the law governing parole considerations. 85 The su-
preme court then established two rules applicable to initial charges.
The first rule applied to all death penalty cases proceeding to trial af-
ter Atkins and stated that, if requested by the defendant, the trial
judge shall charge the jury that the term "'life imprisonment' is to be
understood in its ordinary and plain meaning."' 8' The second rule
marks a drastic change in the court's approach. The rule applies to all
death penalty cases proceeding to trial after Atkins that the Omnibus
Criminal Justice Improvements Act of 1986 controls.18 7 If requested by
the defendant, the trial judge may give, in lieu of the "life imprison-
ment" language of the first rule, an instruction that completely ex-
plains the statutory scheme of parole eligibility when a death sentence
is imposed.188 This second rule is quite remarkable considering the
prior line of cases. It gives the defendant a choice. If the defendant
feels that the jury would consider twenty or thirty years just punish-
ment in lieu of death, then the defendant can opt for the second in-
struction. Alternatively, if he feels that the jury would only accept "life
imprisonment" in its literal sense over death, then the defendant can
opt for the first rule and hope that the jury takes the instruction liter-
ally. Either way, the court has veered from an unrealistic approach and
perhaps has recognized the logic of the United States Supreme Court
in California v. Ramos.8 9
Unfortunately, Atkins addressed only the initial charge given to
the jury about parole eligibility. 190 Considering the subsequent hold-
ings in Plemmons"9' and Smith,19' the court did not intend to expand
Atkins to the situation in which the jury returns and specifically asks
185. Id. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 305.
186. Id.
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-730 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
188. The instruction states, in part:
When the state seeks the death penalty and a statutory aggravating circum-
stance is specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt, and a recommendation
of death is not made, the trial court must impose a sentence of life imprison-
inent without eligibility for parole until the service of thirty years. When a
statutory aggravating circumstance is not found beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and shall not be eligible
for parole until the service of twenty years.
Atkins, 293 S.C. at 300, 360 S.E.2d at 306.
189. 463 U.S, 992 (1983).
190. Although this is not expressly stated in the opinion, it is clearly evident be-
cause the court decided Johnson and Atkins on the same day, and Johnson applies only
when the jury returns with a specific question about parole eligibility.
191. 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E.2d 871 (1988).
192. 298 S.C. 482, 381 S.E.2d 724 (1989), cert. denied, 110 U.S. 1536 (1990).
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about parole. Thus, two troublesome scenarios are possible. First, the
case does not come under the revised statute, the defendant chooses
the first initial charge of Atkins 193 or no specific charge at all, and the
jury returns with a question on parole eligibility. Second, the case falls
under the revised statute, the defendant chooses the first charge of At-
kins194 or no charge at all, and the jury returns with a question on
parole eligibility.
In the second scenario, the defendant may argue that the jury's
belief that he would be released on parole after a "short" period caused
them to sentence him to death to avoid this social injustice. This is
not, however, a valid argument about the prejudicial effect of the
judge's response to the jury's question, regardless of which part of the
Norris instruction the judge's response may contain. The defendant
forfeited his chance to inform the jury about the statutory require-
ments for parole, and the law should estop him from making any argu-
ment that this unduly prejudiced him.
The first scenario resembles Smith and impacts those cases pend-
ing under the old statute. The accused has no option to inform the jury
of the statutory parole scheme. The defendant's argument is this: If
the jury had known he would have been in prison for at least twenty
years, they would not have sentenced him to death. As noted, the court
apparently is unwilling to rectify this situation.
Another argument available to the accused is that any knowledge
the jury had of the possibility of parole prejudiced him because the
jury felt he could not be returned to society.'95 The only way the court
could avoid this is to intentionally mislead the jury into believing that
no possibility of parole existed. Although the supreme court may have
tolerated an ambiguous instruction in the past, it certainly would not
sanction an outright fraud upon the jury just to achieve a perceived
legislative intent. Thus, Atkins has resolved the parole eligibility issue
for capital sentencing cases under the Omnibus Criminal Justice Act.
Smith merely technically violated the Norris rule. Nonetheless,
the case highlights the impossible task faced by the court in its effort
to adhere to legislative intent. Atkins was the first evidence that the
court had realized the futility of its efforts and was willing to follow a
more realistic approach. Smith presented an ideal opportunity to ex-
pose the inadequacies of Norris and establish a new rule based on At-
193. "ITIhe trial judge shall charge the jury that the term 'life imprisonment' is to
be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning." State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 300, 360
S.E.2d 302, 305 (1987), vacated sub nom. Patterson v. South Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 709
(1990).
194. Id.
195. This was precisely the argument that the defendant made in Smith. See 298
S.C. at 487, 381 S.E.2d at 727.
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kins. The supreme court failed to take this opportunity.
Stephen E. Bondura
VII. BILL OF PEACE SUPERSEDED BY RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT FOR RULE 37 DIsMIssAL OF ACTION
In Baughman v. AT&T 96 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP) supersede
the common law bill of peace1 97 procedure. The Baughman court also
decided that prejudice against the adverse party is a necessary element
to grant a rule 37 sanction of dismissal. 98
Baughman v. AT&T resulted from four complaints, originally
brought by 271 plaintiffs against defendants, American Telephone and
Telegraph Company and AT&T Nassau Metals Corporation (Nassau).
The plaintiffs claimed personal injury losses, property damage, and
loss of consortium due to alleged air and water pollution from Nassau's
Gaston plant. Plaintiffs alleged that smoke and odors from Nassau's
plant caused them physical injuries and had diminished the value, use,
and enjoyment of their property. 99 Although neither the plaintiffs nor
Nassau applied for a bill of peace, and although Nassau actively op-
posed the procedure,00 retired South Carolina Supreme Court Chief
Justice C. Bruce Littlejohn, appointed as Special Presiding Judge, con-
solidated the plaintiffs' cases for a single nonjury trial by invoking a
bill of peace.
20 1
The bill of peace procedure existed at common law in South Caro-
lina prior to the adoption of the SCRCP.202 South Carolina, however,
adopted a restrictive bill of peace procedure to apply in actions in eq-
196. 298 s.c. 127, 378 S.E.2d 599 (1989).
197. The bill of peace was originally an equitable procedure that enabled courts to
claim jurisdiction over multiple parties to suppress litigation and to prevent multiplicity
of suits. J, STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 184 (1972). Prior to the merger of the courts of
law and equity, parties faced with a threat of multiplicity of litigation had an inadequate
remedy at law because common law rules discouraged joinder of parties and because the
procedures were not suited to address the rights of unknown, unnamed, or nonpartici-
pating persons whose interests might be decided in the litigation. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (1986); Chafee, Bills of Peace With
Multiple Parties, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1297 (1932).
198. 298 S.C. at 129-30, 378 S.E.2d at 601.
199. Record at 1.
200. Id. at 2-3.
201. Id. at 8.
202. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Yonce, 181 S.C. 369, 377-78, 187 S.E. 536,
539-40 (1936) (general discussion of bills in equity).
[Vol. 42
30
South Carolina Law Review, ol. 42, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss1/12
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
uity but not in actions at law.2 °0 The supreme court's Baughman opin-
ion resolves the conflict between the SCRCP and the common law bill
of peace.
The SCRCP "govern[s] the procedure in all South Carolina courts
in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in
equity .. ,"o Rule 81 provides that "the procedure [in South Caro-
lina trial courts] shall conform to these rules insofar as practicable.
20 5
The common law bill of peace applied in equity cases requires
multiple parties who share a community of interest. A class action
under rule 23 is the modern procedure for multiple parties to sue who
share common questions of law or fact.20 8 The drafters of rule 23 found
the seeds of the class action in the bill of peace.2 7
Under rule 42 the trial court may consolidate actions into a "joint
hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the action" when the
matters have a "common question of law or fact .... -208 "In further-
ance of convenience or to avoid prejudice" the court "may order a sep-
arate trial of any claim ... or of any separate issue .... ,,2o9 There-
fore, rule 42 enables the courts effectively to manage multi-party cases.
Thus, the stated purpose of the SCRCP, to govern procedure in
the trial courts, coupled .with the authority-given to trial courts under
the SCRCP, indicates that the SCRCP preempts similar pre-Code pro-
cedures. Although the supreme court's opinion in Baughman held that
the bill of peace is no longer a viable procedure in South Carolina, it
also gives strength to the argument that other pre-Code procedures
have been replaced.
In Baughman the court also held that the bill of peace procedure
was inadequate because it violated Nassau's right to a trial by jury.21 0
Article 1, section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution provides that
"[tihe right of trial by jury shall be preserved inviolate. '21 The right
to a jury trial depends on the main purpose of the suit.
21 2
203. See Id. at 377-79, 187 S.E. at 539-40; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Parker, 71 F.2d 872, 876 (4th Cir. 1934); Hellams v. Switzer, 24 S.C. 39, 44 (1885).
204. S.C.R. Civ. P. 1.
205. Id. 81.
206. See id. 23.
207. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation To Class Action Part II: Interest, Class,
and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1099 (1980); see 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 197, at § 1751.
208. S.C.R. Civ. P. 42(a).
209. Id. 42(b).
210. See Baughman, 298 S.C. at 129, 378 S.E.2d at 600-01.
211. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
212. See Collins Music Co. v. Lightsey, 285 S.C. 108, 110, 328 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1985)
(party sought both money damages and equitable relief but court stated that the party's
primary form of relief sought was an injunction; therefore, no jury trial).
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In Baughman the plaintiffs' primary claims were for damages al-
though injunctive relief from the allegedly polluted emissions was also
sought. The effect of the Baughman court's decision to allow a jury
trial is that in nuisance cases, in which the plaintiff seeks an injunction
but also claims significant damages, the court will grant the plaintiff a
jury trial.
Rule 38(d) provides that "[a] demand for trial by jury made as
herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the par-
ties, except where an opposing party is in default under Rule 55(a)."21
A defendant can, under rule 38(d), rely on the plaintiff's demand for a
jury trial.214 In Baughman the supreme court ruled that plaintiffs were
entitled to a jury trial on their damage claims, and, therefore, defend-
ant Nassau was also entitled to a jury trial.215 The Baughman ruling is
the first interpretation of rule 38(d) by the supreme court.
In Baughman the court also held that dismissal of an action for
failure to comply with a discovery order is too severe a sanction when
that failure has not prejudiced the adverse party.
216
Thirty-eight of the plaintiffs in Baughman failed to answer the
defendant's second set of interrogatories. Nassau moved to compel the
plaintiffs to answer and requested sanctions for the plaintiffs' failure to
respond. Judge Littlejohn, pursuant to rule 37(b)(2), granted Nassau's
motion for sanctions and dismissed with prejudice the claims of the
plaintiffs who had not responded.
1 7
Rule 37, sections (b) and (d) provide for the sanction of dismissal
when one party has failed to respond to interrogatories or to a court
order.21 " In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
213. S.C.R. Civ. P. 38(d).
214. Cram v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 375 F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1967) (court inter-
preted rule 38 to allow a party to rely on demand for jury trial by opposing party); see
also In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1982); DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life
Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); DeGioia v.
United States Lines Co., 304 F.2d 421, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1962).
215. 298 S.C. at 129, 378 S.E.2d at 600-01.
216. Id. at 130, 378 S.E.2d at 601.
217. Record at 4-6.
218. Rule 37(d) provides, "If a party ... fails ... to serve answers or objections to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories...
the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to
the failure as are just. . . ." S.C.R. Civ. P. 37(d). Rule 37(b) provides:
If a party ... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the
court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
[Vol. 42
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Commerciales v. Rogers2 19 the United States Supreme Court thor-
oughly discussed the authority of the trial court to dismiss an action
for failure to comply with an order. The Court stated that "whether a
court has power to dismiss a complaint because of noncompliance with
a production order depends exclusively upon Rule 37, ''220 and that sim-
ply failing to comply with an order may be sufficient to invoke the
sanction.221 The Court further noted that "there are constitutional lim-
itations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid
processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportu-
nity for a hearing on the merits of his cause. '222 Finally, the Court
concluded that "Rule 37 should not be construed to authorize dismissal
• . . because of petitioner's noncompliance with a pretrial production
order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due
to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of
petitioner.
223
On the other hand, in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc. 224 the United States Supreme Court held that,
[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or
rule must be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not
merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant
such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
225
The Court concluded that the extreme sanction of dismissal was ap-
propriate because of the respondents' "flagrant bad faith" and their
counsel's "callous disregard" in failing to answer written interrogato-
ries in a timely manner.22 I
In Baughman the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the dis-
missal of the plaintiffs' complaint because the defendant had not been
prejudiced by the failure of the thirty-eight plaintiffs to respond.
South Carolina law places the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to show
that their noncompliance did not prejudice the defendant.221 In certain
party ....
Id. 37(b).
219. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
220. Id. at 207.
221. Id. at 207-08.
222. Id. at 209.
223. Id. at 212.
224. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
225. Id. at 643.
226. Id.
227. Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 46, 362 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Ct. App. 1987). "The
rights of discovery provided by the Rules give the trial lawyer the means to be prepared
for trial. Where these rights are not accorded, prejudice must be presumed and, unless
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circumstances, however, the failure to answer interrogatories may not
prejudice the opposing party.228 In Baughman the court found no
prejudice because the information received by Nassau from depositions
and answers was similar to the type of information found in the
interrogatories.
The basis for dismissal under rule 37, however, is not centered on
the lack of finding prejudice, but, rather, on the willfulness, bad faith,
or fault of the party who has not complied with the court's order.229
In Baughman the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the dis-
missal without stating that the lower court had committed a clear
abuse of discretion. The supreme court has adopted the rule that an
abuse of discretion means that a judge's ruling was based on an error
of law or is without evidentiary support.230 Furthermore, South Caro-
lina adopted the rule that the reviewing court "may not substitute [its]
judgment for [the lower court's] simply because [it] might have
reached a different conclusion had [it] been in his place .... ,,221 Fi-
nally, South Carolina adopted the rule that "[tihe burden always rests
upon the appellant to show an abuse of discretion; and in determining
whether an abuse of discretion occurred, the case must be considered
in the light of its underlying circumstances." '232
The court's holding in Baughman may signify several different re-
sults: (1) the reviewing court does not have to find an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial court to reverse the court on discovery matters; (2) an
abuse of discretion may be read implicitly into a decision by virtue of
the reversal; (3) dismissal of a case for failure to answer interrogatories
when the adverse party is not prejudiced is an error of law; (4) dismis-
sal of a case for failure to comply with 'a court order when the adverse
party is not prejudiced is an error of law; (5) in a complex suit the
evidentiary support for a dismissal is inadequate when the adverse
party is not prejudiced; or (6) some combination of the above.
One clear conclusion of the Baughman holding is that it is an error
of law to dismiss a case for failure to answer interrogatories when the
opposing party is not prejudiced. Because the plaintiffs in Baughman
not only failed to answer the interrogatories, but also failed to comply
the party who has failed to submit to discovery can show a lack of prejudice, reversal is
required." Id.
228. See Board of Educ. of Evanston v. Admiral Heating and Ventilating, Inc., 104
F.R.D. 23 (N.D. 11. 1984).
229. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976).
230. Fontaine v. Peitz, 291 S.C. 536, 538-39, 354 S.E.2d 565, 566-67 (1987).
231. Wallace v. Timmons, 237 S.C. 411, 421, 117 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1961).
232. Em-Co Metal Prods., Inc. v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 280 S.C. 107, 110, 311
S.E.2d 83, 85 (Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted).
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with a court order, it may be that to dismiss a case without prejudice
to the adverse party is an error of law when a party fails to comply
with a court order.
The Baughman decision seems less clear when compared to the
standard followed by the United States Supreme Court. In National
Hockey League233 the Court stated:
The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the
Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have dismissed the ac-
tion; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing
.... We think that the lenity evidenced in the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, while certainly a significant factor in considering the im-
position of sanctions under Rule 37, cannot be allowed to wholly sup-
plant other and equally necessary considerations embodied in that
Rule.2
34
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
dismissal, concluding that "the extreme sanction of dismissal was ap-
propriate in this case by reason of respondents' 'flagrant bad faith' and
their counsel's 'callous disregard' of their responsibilities. '235 Although
the Supreme Court in National Hockey did not discuss the question of
prejudice to the adverse party as a requirement, the standard for the
sanction appears to be based upon the culpability of the sanctioned
party and not the effect upon the adverse party. Furthermore, rule 37
does not seem to impose such a "prejudice" element.
Until a South Carolina court articulates a clear standard for dis-
missal, prejudice to the adverse party will remain a prerequisite to dis-
missal. It is unclear whether the prejudice element applies to a dismis-
sal for failure to comply with a court order or merely for failure to
answer interrogatories. Because the power of the trial court to dispense
justice in an orderly manner is an underlying part or the SCRCP, a
strong argument can be made that under certain circumstances the ul-
timate sanction of dismissal is appropriate for failure to comply with a
court order, even in the absence of prejudice to the adverse party.
Michael W. Hogue
233. 427 U.S. 639 (1976).
234. Id: at 642.
235. Id. at 643.
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VIII. CITIZENS' EXCUSABLE NEGLECT USED TO IMPOSE DUTY ON
GOVERNMENT
In Thompson v. Hammond 36 the South Carolina Supreme Court
granted relief to a group of Horry County landowners who opposed a
public road closing. The South Carolina Court of Appeals had affirmed
the circuit court's judgment that ordered the closing. The supreme
court granted certiorari and applied rule 60(b)(1)2'7 of the South Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court decided that the landowners
had a meritorious defense and that the judgment had been taken
against them because of "excusable neglect.' 238 The supreme court
granted the landowners a new trial.
Sidney Thompson petitioned the circuit court to close a public
landing on the Intracoastal Waterway and a section of the public road
that lead to the landing that adjoined his property. Thompson alleged
that Horry County had abandoned the landing and adjacent road. He
personally served notice of his petition on Horry County. He served by
publication all others who claimed an interest in the property.
239
A landowner whose property abuts the public road, but not the
disputed area, read Thompson's legal advertisement and contacted
Thompson's attorney to inform him that individuals who owned prop-
erty along the road opposed the petition. The lawyer promised to tell
Thompson of the landowners' opposition and to notify the landowners
of Thompson's response. 0 When the landowner did not receive any
reply from the lawyer, he circulated a petition to oppose the closing
236. 299 S.C. 116, 382 S.E.2d 900 (1989).
237. Rule 60(b)(1) provides that "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect ...... S.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) is essentially the same as former South
Carolina Code section 15-27-130. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
S.CR. CIv. P. 60(b) reporters' notes. Significantly, the new rule, drawn from federal rule
60(b), deletes the pronoun "his" which referred to the party against whom the judgment
was taken and this appeared in section 15-27-130 in front of the phrase "mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise or excusable neglect." The new language, thus, allows for relief even
when a third party causes the complained-of error. See id.
238. See Thompson, 299 S.C. at 119, 382 S.E.2d at 902-03.
239. Id. at 117, 382 S.E.2d at 901-02. South Carolina Code sections 57-9-10 to -40
govern the abandonment or closing of streets, roads or highways. The Code provides for
a petition and notice, but not for a public hearing. A petitioner must serve notice on
adjacent landowners, and may notify all other interested parties by publication. S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 57-9-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
Although in Thompson the landowners' property did not abut the landing and im-
mediately adjoining road, the landowners had standing as defendants because the court
considered "the best interest of all concerned." Id.
240. See Thompson, 299 S.C. at 117-18, 382 S.E.2d at 902.
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and gathered eighteen signatures. He then forwarded the petition to
his county councilman, Alton Duncan. The county council voted to op-
pose the road closing and, more importantly, notified the landowners
of its decision. In reliance on the county's representations, the land-
owners took no further steps to protect their interests.24'
Two days before the scheduled judicial hearing, however, the
county voted not to oppose the closing at a nonpublic session at which
Councilman Duncan was not present.2 2 The supreme court noted that
"[n]either Mr. Duncan nor the landowners were notified of the
County's change in position or the date of the hearing."24
At the hearing, the county attorney informed the court that the
county did not oppose the petition to close-the public road. No land-
owners appeared to oppose Thompson's petition. Based on testimony
presented by Thompson and his neighbor, Mr. Hammond, the circuit
court ordered the public road closed and the land divided between the
petitioners. Approximately two months later, the landowners learned
of the closing and moved for relief pursuant to rule 60(b).2"" Thompson
and Hammond already had established boundary lines and received
deeds to the property.
245
Under rule 60(b)(1), before the landowners could obtain relief
from the final judgment of the circuit court,46 they had to establish (1)
that the judgment was taken against them by mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect 247 and (2) that they had a meritorious
defense.248 These requirements were once virtually insurmountable
hurdles, but gradually the courts have eased the burden on petitioners
to allow judges to decide cases on the merits rather than dismiss them
on technicalities.49
241. Id. at 118, 382 S.E.2d at 901-902.
242. Id.
243. Id., 382 S.E.2d at 902.
244. See id. The county also moved for relief pursuant to rule 60(b)(1). The county
claimed that it made a mistake in not notifying the landowners of its change in position.
Both the court of appeals and the supreme court held that the authorized statements of
its attorney at the hearing bound the county. Id. at 119, 382 S.E.2d at 902; Thompson v.
Hammond, 294 S.C. 95, 98, 362 S.E.2d 879, 880-81 (Ct. App. 1987).
245. Thompson, 294 S.C. at 97, 362 S.E.2d at 880 (court of appeals' decision).
246. Thompson v. Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 119, 382 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1989).
247. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 398-402
(1985).
248. See id. at 402-03. A meritorious defense was a requirement under Code section
15-27-130 prior to the adoption of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court of appeals has held that the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure has not
changed this requirement. See Mitchell Supply Co. v. Gaffney, 297 S.C. 160, 375 S.E.2d
321 (Ct. App. 1988).
249. See H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, supra note 247, at 399. For an example of the
historical view, see McDaniel v. Addison, 53 S.C. 222, 230, 31 S.E. 226, 229 (1898):
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In addressing the first requirement of rule 60(b), the landowners
relied on Graham v. Town of Loris250 for the proposition that a client's
neglect is excusable when an attorney abandons the client without rea-
sonable notice to him of the imminent hearing date. 51 The Graham
court found excusable neglect when the town attorney willfully aban-
doned his client without reasonable notice. In Graham the court held
that "[c]onscience require[d] [the] Court to charge the attorney alone
with his gross dereliction of duty and not to visit its consequences
upon an innocent client." '252
Thompson argued Graham was not relevant, however, because in
Graham the town was the attorney's client. In Thompson the landown-
ers were third parties who merely assumed that the county would de-
fend the matter. Thompson alleged that because the landowners could
have taken steps to protect themselves, but failed to do so, they were
guilty of culpable neglect.
53
The court of appeals agreed with Thompson and held that the
landowners' reliance on the county was not justified and the landown-
ers, therefore, had not shown excusable neglect. The court of appeals
declared that the county
had no special duty to give the protesting landowners additional no-
tice of its position. Even if there had been such a duty, a failure of the
County to advise the protesting landowners of the position it would
take in court would not be a ground for vacating the judgment....
[The landowners] had a duty to give the case their personal attention,
keeping themselves informed of its progress. . . . They claim to have
relied upon the County to protect their private interests, but they
have shown no basis in law to justify such reliance. Horry County had
no duty to protect or represent them in the litigation nor did it under-
take to do so.. . . If they were misled, it is due to their own fault or
to their ignorance, for which the law provides no remedy.
2"
The law has, in the plainest terms, prescribed certain requirements, one of
which is that a failure to answer the complaint within 20 days entitles the
plaintiff to a judgment by default; and, if a defendant fails to comply with this
plain and simple requirement, he must take the consequences, even though
they may result in what some persons would call manifest injustice.
Id. The court of appeals adopted a more modern viewpoint in Roberts v. Peterson, 292
S.C. 149, 151, 355 S.E.2d 280, 281 (Ct. App. 1987) ("It is the general rule in this country
that when an employee hands suit papers to his/her employer and the employer fails to
properly answer the suit papers, the courts grant relief to the defaulting defendant in the
interest of trying cases on their merits.").
250. 272 S.C. 442, 248 S.E.2d 594 (1978).
251. Brief of Appellant at 12.
252. Graham, 272 S.C. at 452-53, 248 S.E.2d at 599.
253. See Thompson v. Hammond, 294 S.C. 95, 98, 362 S.E.2d 879, 880-81 (Ct. App.
1987).
254. Id. at 98-99, 362 S.E.2d at 880-81 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 42
38
outh Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss1/12
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, stated that although
the landowners did not hire an attorney or file an answer, they did take
steps to protect themselves. The court noted that the County Council
assured the landowners that it would oppose the road closing. More-
over, the court emphasized that the county did not notify the landown-
ers of its change in position. Thus, based on the totality of the circum-
stances, the supreme court concluded that the landowners
demonstrated excusable neglect.255
Turning to the question of a meritorious defense, the supreme
court found the landowners had demonstrated the existence of a real
controversy on the issue of whether the county had abandoned the
road. The county, in fact, had maintained the road within two years
prior to the litigation and had used the landing to replenish water sup-
plies for its fire trucks..25 Based on these facts, the supreme court con-
cluded that the landowners had presented a meritorious defense.157
The supreme court also found that the trial judge had committed
reversible error because he based his conclusions on evidence not prop-
erly before the court. The day before the hearing, the trial judge made
an ex parte viewing of the property.25 At the hearing, the judge, not-
ing the poor state of repair of the landing, expressed his opinion that
the county voted to abandon the road to avoid liability should someone
be injured there.2 19 The court held that not only was the judge's ex
parte viewing itself improper, but that the judge used his conclusions
to deny relief under rule 60(b)(1) because, in the trial judge's opinion,
the landowners could have no meritorious defense.60
A broad reading of Thompson and its "totality of the circum-
stances" test would place a duty on any defendant not to make repre-
sentations on which other parties might rely to their detriment. The
supreme court expressed concern with this possibility and precluded
the application of Thompson to private litigants: "It should be noted.
that this is a peculiar case because the road involved was a public, not
255. Thompson v. Hammond, 299 S.C. 116, 120-21, 382 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1989).
256. Id. at 120, 382 S.E.2d at 903.
257. Id. The court noted that a meritorious defense "need be only one which is wor-
thy of a hearing or judicial inquiry because it raises a question of law deserving of some
investigation and discussion or a real controversy as to real facts .... ." Id. (quoting
Graham v. Town of Loris, 272 S.C. 442, 453, 248 S.E.2d 594, 599 (1978)).
258. Id. at 118, 382 S.E.2d at 902.
259. Id. at 118-19, 382 S.E.2d at 902.
260. Id. at 121, 382 S.E.2d at 903-04. Thompson argued that the trial judge never
reached the meritorious defense issue because the appellants failed to establish excusa-
ble neglect. In a separate dissent, Justice Chandler agreed with the respondent. See id.
at 122 n.3, 382 S.E.2d at 904 n.3 (Chandler, J. dissenting). Justice Chandler also noted
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private, road and, therefore, was the responsibility of the County. This
is not the usual situation where the subject of the litigation is the re-
sponsibility of the individual plaintiff or defendant.
'261
Thompson is unique and its holding should be confined to the
facts. The case suggests that whenever a governmental entity appears
as a party to a controversy it must give notice to interested constitu-
ents, not only of its position, but also of any change in that position.
Deborah P. Morgan
IX. LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP TEST FOR COMPUTING COUNTERCLAIMS
ADOPTED
In North Carolina Federal Savings and Loan Association v. DAV
Corp.2 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the logical rela-
tionship test for determining whether counterclaims are compulsory
under rule 13(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
North Carolina Federal Savings and Loan Association (North Car-
olina Federal) commenced this foreclosure action on a note and mort-
gage that Parasol Inn Joint Venture gave to finance a real estate pro-
ject located in Horry County, South Carolina. The Parasol Inn Joint
Venture consisted of DAV Corporation, NCF Financial Corporation (a
wholly owned subsidiary of North Carolina Federal), and Parasol De-
velopment Corporation. DAV counterclaimed against North Carolina
Federal and demanded a jury trial on these claims. 2 s The trial judge
refused this demand. Thus, DAV appealed to the South Carolina Court
of Appeals.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals used two different tests to
find that DAV asserted permissive counterclaims.264 First, the counter-
261. Id. at 120-21, 382 S.E.2d at 903.
262. 298 S.C. 514, 381 S.E.2d 903 (1989).
263. Id. DAV made the following counterclaims:
(1) breach of a subsequent oral contract to arrange additional fifiancing for
interest payments and construction costs; (2) breach of the joint venture agree-
ment as parent company of joint venturer NCF by bringing the foreclosure
action; (3) breach of fiduciary duty to co-joint venturers; (4) wrongful dissolu-
tion of the joint venture by failing to voluntarily refrain from foreclosure as
agreed; (5) violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act by breaching the oral
agreement; (6) breach of two subsequent oral contracts to purchase DAV's in-
terest in the joint venture.
Id. at 517, 381 S.E.2d at 904-05.
264. A party waives his right to a jury trial when he asserts a permissive counter-
claim. Conversely, a party does not waive his right to a jury trial when he asserts a
compulsory counterclaim in an equity action. See id. at 517, 381 S.E.2d at 905.
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claim is compulsory if the issues of fact and law raised by the claim
and counterclaim are substantially the same. Second, the counterclaim
is compulsory if any logical relation exists between the claim and coun-
terclaim. The court of appeals found that DAV's counterclaims did not
satify either of these tests.65 The South Carolina Supreme Court relied
solely on the logical relationship test to conclude, however, that all but
one of DAV's six counterclaims were compulsory.
268
Prior to South Carolina's adoption of rule pleading in 1985, stat-
utes controlled counterclaims under the code pleading system.
26 7
Under the code pleading provision, a defendant could counterclaim if
the claim (1) arose out of the "contract or transaction set forth in the
complaint," 268 (2) was "connected with the subject of the action,' 26 9 or
(3) arose "out of the same state of facts" as the complaint. 270 Further-
more, the defendant could assert any counterclaim independent of the
complaint's cause of action only if the action "arises on the contract"
and the counterclaim existed at the time the plaintiff filed suit.27 1 Rule
13(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure now requires an
opposing party to assert a counterclaim "if it arises out of the transac-
tion or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim. ' 272 This language is identical to rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
2 7 3
The courts have developed four tests to determine whether a
counterclaim is compulsory.274 First, a counterclaim is compulsory
265. North Carolina Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n. v. DAV Corp., 294 S.C. 27, 362
S.E.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd in part, af'd in part, 298 S.C. 514, 381 S.E.2d 903
(1989).
266. North Carolina Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 298 S.C. at 518, 381 S.E.2d at 905.
267. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-15-30, -50 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (the legislature repealed
both statutes on July 1, 1985).




272. S.C.R. Civ. P. 13(a). The rule states:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the
claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought the suit upon his
claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire juris-
diction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not
stating any counterclaim under this rule 13.
273. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
274. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1410, at 52-55
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when it presents issues of fact and law substantially similar to those
contained in the claim. 75 This test is not useful because the issues in
any particular case usually are unclear until the the parties complete
their pleadings and begin discovery.
7 6
Second, a counterclaim is compulsory when the doctrine of res
judicata bars a subsequent suit on the defendant's claim.277 This test
effectively is worthless because the courts generally hold that in the
absence of a compulsory counterclaim rule, a party is never barred by
res judicata from suing independently later.
2 7 8
Third, a counterclaim is compulsory when it involves substantially
the same evidence as the original claim.279 Although this test is effec-
tive in some circumstances, some counterclaims may be compulsory
even though they do not meet this test.2s0 For example, if a party seeks
to void an insurance policy because of fraud and another party asserts
a counterclaim for injuries that the policy covers, the counterclaim
would not be compulsory because the evidence for fraud would be dif-
ferent from the evidence for the injury claim. This test requires the use
of one or more companion tests to address all of the compulsory coun-
terclaim issues.281
Fourth, a counterclalim is compulsory when it has a logical rela-
tionship with the original claim.282 Most states,28 3 including South Car-
olina,2 4 have adopted this test. The South Carolina Supreme Court
noted that the logical relationship test is "widely accepted because of
its flexibility. ' 285 The logical relationship test also promotes judicial
economy because it allows rule 13 to apply to any counterclaim that
could profitably be tried with the main claim. 6 On the other hand,
use of the logical relationship test could result in unnecessary litigation
(1976). The Fourth Circuit does not apply any single test, but uses all four to determine
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. See Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S
Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1976).
275. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 274, § 1410, at 52.
276. Id. at 58.
277. Id. at 59.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 60.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 61.
283. Id. at 65.
284. North Carolina Fed. Say. and Loan v. DAV Corp., 298 S.C. 514, 518, 381 S.E.2d
903, 905 (1989).
285. Id., 381 S.E.2d at 905; see also 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 274, §
1410 at 61 ("The hallmark of this approach is its flexibility.").
286. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 274, § 1410 at 65.
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due to the case-by-case nature of the analysis.28 7
Many courts have expanded the logical relationship test. In Revere
Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.2 8 8 the Fifth
Circuit held that a claim is logically related to the main claim "if it
arises out of the same aggregate of operative facts as the original
claim. ' 289 Likewise, in Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper
Co. 291 the Third Circuit held that:
[T.]he phrase 'logical relationship' is given meaning by the purpose of
the rule which it was designed to implement. Thus, a counterclaim is
logically related to the opposing party's claim where separate trials on
each of their respective claims would involve a substantial duplication
of effort and time by the parties and the courts. Where multiple
claims involve many of the same factual issues, or the same factual
and legal issues, or where they are offshoots of the same basic contro-
versy between the parties, fairness and considerations of convenience
and of economy require that the counterclaimant be permitted to
maintain his cause of action. Indeed the doctrine of res judicata com-
pels the counterclaimant to assert his claim in the same suit for it
would be barred if asserted separately, subsequently.291
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not elaborate on
their reasons for adopting the logical relationship test, their holding
provides an operational test for determining whether a counterclaim is
compulsory. The logical relationship test allows courts to apply rule
13(a) broadly. Thus, the courts can adjudicate a greater number of
counterclaims with the related claims.
For the practitioner, South Carolina's adoption of the logical rela-
tionship test provides an established rule for determining that a coun-
terclaim is compulsory. Because of the wide scope of the test, the cau-
tious practitioner should assert any possible counterclaim that is
logically related to the adverse party's claim in order to avoid a subse-
quent bar by res judicata.
Michael Don Stokes
287. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 384 F. Supp.
600, 603 (D. Mass. 1974) (quoting 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 274, § 1410 at
47).
288. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
289. Id. at 715.
290. 286 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1961).
291. Id. at 634.
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X. LATE-DISCOVERED JUROR MISCONDUCT NOT A BAR TO A NEW
TRIAL: PARTY MAY AMEND MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL UNDER RULES 59
AND 60(b)
In Gray v. Bryant292 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a party may amend a motion to seek a new trial after the ten-day pe-
riod for filing a new trial motion has expired.293 This rule applies when
a party seeks to include the allegation of juror disqualification based
on a juror's predisposition when the party could not have discovered
the evidence within the ten-day filing period.
294
In Gray the jury returned a verdict for the respondent, Dr. Bry-
ant. The appellant filed a tiinely motion for a new trial and asserted
five errors that were unrelated to juror disqualification. On the day the
jury decided the case, however, one juror sent a letter to a newspaper
that praised physicians and strongly criticized people who sue them.295
After the newspaper published the juror's letter, the appellant sought
to amend his original motion for a new trial on the grounds that during
voir dire the juror did not reveal that she was both (1) unable to decide
the case fairly and impartially because of her prejudice toward people
who sue physicians, and (2) that she was a former patient of the re-
spondent, Dr. Bryant.
296
Rule 59 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure does not
provide a procedure to amend a motion for a new trial .or to add new
grounds after the expiration of the ten-day period. 297 The supreme
court, however, relied on the 1953 case Smith v. Quattlebaum29 8 and
held that courts must read rule 59 in conjunction with rule 60(b),
which is the newly discovered evidence exception. 2"9 The Gray court
292. 298 S.C. 285, 379 S.E.2d 894 (1989).
293. Rule 59 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to
make a motion for a new trial no later than ten days after the entry of judgment. The
rule states that "[t]he motion for a new trial shall be made promptly after the jury is
discharged, or in the discretion of the court not later than 10 days thereafter." S.C.R. Civ.
P. 59(b).
294. Gray, 298 S.C. at 287-88, 379 S.E.2d at 895-96.
295. Record at 96.
296. Although the juror's letter revealed prejudice and bias, Dr. Bryant's prior treat-
ment of the juror was first revealed to appellants counsel at the motion hearing. See id.
at 70-71.
297. See S.C.R. Civ. P. 59.
298. 223 S.C. 384, 76 S.E.2d 154 (1953).
299. Gray, 298 S.C. at 286-87, 354 S.E.2d at 895-96. Rule 60(b) of the South Caro-
lina Rules of Civil Procedure reads, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: ... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
[Vol. 42
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explained that in Smith the South Carolina Supreme Court applied a
newly discovered evidence exception to give the trial court jurisdiction
to consider a motion for a new trial based on an after-discovered rela-
tionship of a juror to the plaintiff.300 The Gray court applied the same
principle to rule 60(b) and held that a party may amend his motion for
a new trial after he discovers evidence which he could not have discov-
ered within the ten-day time limit, which is established in rule 59(b).
After the court decided that the trial court properly allowed the
appellant to amend the motion for a new trial, the court considered
whether the trial court's denial of the motion was in error. The court
relied on Thompson v. O'Rourke0 1 and identified three conditions that
a party must meet before the court can grant a new trial based on the
disqualification of a juror. The court stated that the Thompson test
requires a "party seeking a new trial . . . [to] show: (1) the fact of
disqualification; (2) the grounds for disqualification were unknown
prior to verdict; and (3) the moving party was not negligent in failing
to learn of the disqualification before verdict."302 The court also ex-
plained that when a seated juror does not respond fully to voir dire
questioning "[r]elief is required only when the court finds the con-
cealed information would have supported a challenge for cause, or
would have been a material factor in the use of a parties' [sic] peremp-
tory challenges." 303
The second and third elements of the Thompson test were met
easily in Gray because the plaintiff could not have discovered the evi-
dence prior to the verdict.30 4 To establish the first element the court
noted that the juror concealed both that she was a patient of Dr. Bry-
ant and that she had a predisposition that could have prevented her
from impartially deciding the case. 5 Because "these facts could have
supported a challenge for cause or could have been a material factor in
the use of the appellant's peremptory challenges," the appellant satis-
fied the fact of disqualification element.308 Thus, the court remanded
the case for a new trial.
3 0 7
Other courts have used similar tests when deciding whether a
party is entitled to a new trial because of juror disqualification. The
59(b); ... The motion shall be made within a reasonable time ....
S.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b).
300. Gray, 298 S.C. at 287, 379 S.E.2d at 895.
301. 288 S.C. 13, 339 S.E.2d 505 (1986).
302. Gray, 298 S.C. at 288, 379 S.E.2d at 896.
303. Id., 379 S.E.2d at 896 (quoting Thompson, 288 S.C. at 15, 339 S.E.2d at 506).
304. Id. at 287, 379 S.E.2d at 896.
305. Id. at 286, 379 S.E.2d at 895.
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courts' decisions apparently turn on whether the juror's conduct is so
egregious that he could not have reached a decision fairly and impar-
tially. In McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood0 8 the United
States Supreme Court held that "only those reasons that affect a ju-
ror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.
'30 9
Furthermore, to obtain a new trial because of juror misconduct "a
party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause. 3 1 0 The Court, therefore, did not mandate a new trial because
the juror's improper response to a voir dire question resulted from con-
fusion and not bias.
3 11
In Warner v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 31 2 the Eighth. Circuit
declined to grant a new trial based on "a vague, uncertain, and indirect
fifteen year old business relationship and a short casual conversation"
between a juror and the plaintiff, because the juror had not failed to
disclose "pertinent information." 313
The Warner court established a three-part test to determine the pro-
priety of granting rule 60(b) relief based on newly-discovered evidence.
Under Warner a party must shown "(1) that the evidence was actually
'newly discovered' . . . (2) that the movant exercised due diligence;
and (3) that the evidence is material, not merely impeaching or cumu-
lative, and that a new trial would probably produce a different re-
sult. '314 Although the Warner court's test is not identical to the one
established by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Gray, it is based
308. 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 556. In this personal injury case, the plaintiff's attorney asked prospec-
tive jurors whether they or members of their families had been injured in an accident. Id.
at 550. The person who became the jury foreman did not reveal that his son had been
injured in the explosion of a truck tire, but he did not believe that his son's broken leg
was comparable to the plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court noted that the question had
confused many of the jurors and that "[t]o invalidate the result of a 3-week trial because
of a juror's mistaken, though honest, response to a question, is to insist on something
closer to perfection than our judicial system can be expected to give." Id. at 555-56.
311. Id. at 556.
312. 739 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir. 1984).
313. Id. Transamerica alleged that a juror failed to disclose an indirect business re-
lationship with the plaintiff, Jerry Warner, during voir dire questioning. Specifically,
Warner, a bank vice-president, made loans to a business owned by the juror's brother.
The juror also worked for his brother's business for a period of time. The juror, however,
"testified that he had never had any direct dealings with either the bank or with Warner
personally since his brother did almost all of the banking business." Id. at 1352. The
court held that these facts did not "constitute the type of exceptional circumstances
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on the same policy rationale, and, therefore, should produce a similar
result.
In McCoy v. Goldstonsl5 the Sixth Circuit stated that "deliberate
concealment or purposefully incorrect responses during voir dire suffice
to show a prejudicial impairment of the right to the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges."3 1 Furthermore, "a prejudicial impairment of the
right to the exercise of peremptory challenges also is established if the
undisclosed information is indicative of probable bias concerning either
a material aspect of the litigation or its outcome."317 The court held
that "a new trial must be granted where the undisclosed information
would have resulted in the juror's disqualification for cause.
''318
In Johnson v. Knapp,31 9 a case factually similar to Gray, the
plaintiffs moved for a new trial under rule 59 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure after the filing period had expired. The court, however,
regarded the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial as a motion to set aside
the judgment pursuant to rule 60(b), under which the plaintiffs' mo-
tion was timely.320
The plaintiffs based their motion on a letter that a member of the
jury panel wrote and addressed to the defendant's trial counsel. In the
letter the juror complimented the attorney on his performance. 321 The
plaintiffs also introduced newspaper articles that the juror had en-
closed with the letter to the defendant's attorney, which the plaintiffs
claimed had given the juror a "preconceived idea that a cataract opera-
315. 652 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1981).
316. Id. at 658. The case is overruled by McDonough Power Equip. v. Greenwood,
464 U.S. 548 (1984), to the extent the case held that a court shall presume bias if a juror
commits perjury on voir dire. Urseth v. City of Dayton, 680 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D.
Ohio 1987). The plaintiffs claimed at trial "that police officers had violated their civil
rights and alleged false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and assault
and battery." McCoy, 652 F.2d at 656. During voir dire the district court questioned the
jurors about past experiences that they, their close friends, and their relatives had with
law enforcement agencies or police departments. Id.
Plaintiffs' counsel did not discover that the jury forewoman concealed her son's pa-
role-officer training until after the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial under rule 59.
After their counsel learned of the son's employment, the plaintiffs fied a "Supplemental
Motion for Relief From Judgment," under rule 60(b), which alleged that the juror's "si-
lence during voir dire abrogated the plaintiff's right to peremptorily challenge her." Id.
The district court denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing or a new trial and stated
that the concealment of the information was probably inadvertent and was not prejudi-
cial. Id. at 657. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' motion for relief from the
judgment established a prima facie case of impropriety. Id.
317. 652 F.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
318. Id.
319. 74 F.R.D. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
320. Id. at 506.
321. Id. at 507.
1990]
47
Bondura et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion was a simple, comical operation ...."I"
The court held that these were not "exceptional circumstances
warranting a divergence from the general rule that a juror's statement
may not be used to impeach that juror's verdict. '3 23 Although the ju-
ror's letter indicated a potential bias, the court did not find it as signif-
icant as the court found the letter in Gray. This policy judgment is a
close call, and each court seems to base its decision on its impression of
how the facts in the case affect the sometimes-conflicting goals of judi-
cial finality and the right to a fair trial.
Throughout the opinion in Gray the supreme court struggled to
reach an equitable result while not departing drastically from the letter
of the Rules. Although the Gray court quoted the portion of rule 60(b)
that gives a court authority to grant relief "upon such terms as are
just," '' it also noted that the plaintiff made the motion to amend
within a reasonable time "and, in fact, before the trial court had ruled
on the original motion.3 s25 Thus, the court implies that if the trial
court had already ruled on the original motion, the result in the case
would have been different. Thus a party who has discovered previously
unknown evidence, which is ,injurious to him, must have made a mo-
tion for relief from a judgment in order to introduce the new evidence.
The decision is a fair and equitable one,* even though the court
leaves open the possibility of a different result if the appellant has not
already moved for a new trial or if the trial court has already ruled
upon the motion. In the absence of a rule that clarifies this issue, the
procedural obstacles which prevent a litigant from receiving a fair trial
may still exist.
Stephen Edward Spelman
322. Id. The articles referred to "the high jinks of one Dr. Charlie, a 'get-em-out-
fast cataract surgeon' with a show business-eye's-view of his profession ... " Id.
323. Id.
324. Gray, 298 S.C. at 287, 379 S.E.2d at 895.
325. Id., 379 S.E.2d at 896.
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XI. EXCEPTIONS IN VIOLATION OF SUPREME COURT RULES JEOPARDIZE
APPEAL
In Burke v. Davidson326 the South Carolina Court of Appeals ac-
cepted an appeal even though the appellant's two exceptions "fail[ed]
to satisfy the requirements of Rule 4, Section 6 of the Supreme Court
Rules" because neither exception contained a complete assignment of
error.3 27 Burke v. Davidson demonstrates the court of appeals' Liberal
allowance of exceptions on appeal even when an exception violates rule
4, section 6 of the Supreme Court Rules and is in conflict with South
Carolina Supreme Court precedent.
A collision between a bicycle and an automobile on a Beaufort,
South Carolina sidewalk created the controversy in Burke. Burke was
riding his bicycle at the time he collided with Davidson's automobile as
Davidson pulled out from a private driveway. Over Burke's objection
the trial court instructed the jury that a Beaufort city ordinance makes
it "unlawful for any person ... to ride a bicycle at any time on any of
the sidewalks of the city."3 28 The jury found for Davidson.
Burke's appeal was based on two exceptions. The first exception
was that "[t]he [trial] court erred in failing to rule on the applicable
law governing this case prior to the submission of the same to the jury
.... 29 In his second exception Burke claimed that "[t]he court
erred in charging city ordinance [sic] Section 8-5001 of the City of
Beaufort."' 30 An examination of the enforcement of Supreme Court
rule 4, section 6 suggests that the court of appeals may have erred in
allowing this appeal.
Rule 4, section 6 of the Supreme Court Rules governs exceptions.
It provides that,
Each exception must contain a concise statement of one proposition of
law or fact which this Court is asked to review, and the same assign-
ment of error should not be repeated. Each exception must contain
within itself a complete assignment of error, and a mere reference
therein to any other exception then or previously taken, or request to
charge will not be considered. The exceptions should not be long or
argumentative in form.3 1
The Supreme Court Rules apply to both the South Carolina Supreme
326. 298 S.C. 370, 380 S.E.2d 839 (Ct. App. 1989).
327. Id. at 371, 380 S.E.2d at 839.
328. Id., 380 S.E.2d at 839-40.
329. Id. at 370, 380 S.E.2d at 839.
330. Id. at 371, 380 S.E.2d at 839.
331. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 6.
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Court and the South Carolina Court of Appeals."3 2
A properly framed exception requires three elements. First, the ex-
ception must specify an error made by the trial court. Second, the
specification of error must identify the point at which the error oc-
curred and why it occurred. Finally, the assignment of error must not
be too vague or general."'
As early as 1913 the South Carolina Supreme Court required ex-
ceptions to "be short, clear, and concise, specifying the errors com-
plained of without circumlocution, argumentation, or repetition
. . . .,,33 Since its 1913 statement on the proper form for exceptions,
the supreme court repeatedly has refused to consider exceptions on ap-
peal that are vague,33 5 that fail to concisely state a proposition of law
or fact,336 that fail to make a complete assignment of error,33 7 and that
engage in useless repetition.3 3 8 The court also often criticizes excep-
tions that require the court to search the whole record, to review all
the evidence, or to retry the case. 3 9
The supreme court only rarely has allowed appeals based upon ex-
ceptions in violation of rule 4, section 6. One example is State v.
Griggs,'3 in which the court allowed an appeal based upon an excep-
tion in violation of rule 4, section 6 because the defendant was being
prosecuted for murder. The supreme court also has been willing to
waive noncompliance with the rule and considers it an exception if it
contains a meritorious assignment of prejudicial error.3 41 Despite these
332. S.C. CT. APP. R. (adopted Supreme Court Rules for the court of appeals).
333. See CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COMM'N, S.C. BAR, SOUTH CAROLINA APPELLATE
PRACTICE HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ (iv)-(vi), at 30-31 (1985).
334. Simpson v. Cox, 95 S.C. 382, 387, 79 S.E. 102, 103 (1913).
335. See Graham v. Kerns, 278 S.C. 197, 294 S.E.2d 38 (1982); Silas v. Brown, 266
S.C. 505, 224 S.E.2d 672 (1976); Phillips Refrigeration Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 256
S.C. 500, 183 S.E.2d 330 (1976); Wren v. Kirkland Distrib. Co., 250 S.C. 178, 156 S.E.2d
865 (1967); Solley v. Weaver, 247 S.C. 129, 146 S.E.2d 164 (1966); Altman v. Midland
Steel Corp., 245 S.C. 91, 138 S.E.2d 832 (1964); Shell v. Brown, 243 S.C. 380, 134 S.E.2d
214 (1963); Polson v. Burr, 235 S.C. 216, 110 S.E.2d 855 (1959).
336. See, e.g., Sloan Constr. Co. v. South Carolina Bd. of Health and Envtl. Control,
285 S.C. 523, 331 S.E.2d 345 (1985); Larry's Wheel and Rim, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat'l
Bank, 271 S.C. 198, 246 S.E.2d 860 (1978).
337. See, e.g., Charleston Housewrecking Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 282
S.C. 443, 319 S.E.2d 338 (1984); Nolf v. Patton, 114 S.C. 323, 103 S.E. 528 (1920).
338. See, e.g., Newsom v. Poe Mfg. Co., 102 S.C. 77, 86 S.E. 195 (1915).
339. See, e.g., Williams v. Regula, 266 S.C. 228, 222 S.E.2d 7 (1976); Boyr v. Loftin-
Woodard, Inc., 247 S.C. 167, 146 S.E.2d 606 (1966); Solley v. Weaver, 247 S.C. 129, 146
S.E.2d 164 (1966).
340. 184 S.C. 304, 311, 192 S.E. 360, 363 (1937).
341. See Allen v. Hatehell, 242 S.C. 458, 467, 131 S.E.2d 516, 521 (1963); Wallace v.
Timmons, 232 S.C. 311, 315, 101 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1958); Brady v. Brady, 222 S.C. 242,
246, 72 S.E.2d 193, 194 (1952); Jackson v. Carter, 128 S.C. 79, 86-87, 121 S.E. 559, 562
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rare occurrences, the supreme court generally has required that excep-
tions be distinctly stated so that "the court may at once see the point
which it is called upon to decide without having to 'grope in the dark'
to ascertain the precise point at issue." 42
The South Carolina Court of Appeals tests for violations of rule 4,
section 6 by determining "whether, despite the improperly framed ex-
ception, the issue sought to be raised is reasonably clear to [the] court
and the adverse party. '34 3 The court of appeals advocates liberal con-
struction of an exception's language unless the statement "has misled
the [opposing party] to his prejudice." '' Thus, "the Court [of Appeals]
is concerned with the substance of the appeal and not the technical
differences in the issues raised by the exceptions. '34 1
Since 1984 the court of appeals has had many opportunities to dis-
miss exceptions for failure to state a complete assignment of error. In
each case in which the court elected not to dismiss, the opinion notes
that they would have been justified in dismissing the appellant's excep-
tions, but they elected to look beyond the improperly framed excep-
tions to consider those issues that were reasonably clear from the ap-
pellant's argument and that were ruled on by the trial court.3 4 1 In
Burke v. Davidson the court allowed Burke's second exception because
"[t]he issue it raise[d] [was] reasonably clear from [Burke's] argument,
and the issue was expressly ruled on by the trial court. 34 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court recently reversed a court of
appeals' decision concerning exceptions in violation of Supreme Court
rule 4, section 6. In Connolly v. People's Life Insurance Co.345 the su-
preme court held that "[t]he exceptions [did] not state why the . . .
cause of action should have been dismissed [or] why the [law] should
(1924).
342. Brady, 222 S.C. at 245, 72 S.E.2d at 194; see also Boyer v. Loftin-Woodard,
Inc., 247 S.C. 167, 170-71, 146 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1966); Shell v. Brown, 243 S.C. 380, 382-
83, 134 S.E.2d 214, 214 (1963); Winter v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240 S.C.
561, 568, 126 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1962); Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. McElmurray, 236 S.C. 141,
143, 113 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1960); Hewitt v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 201, 203, 110
S.E.2d 852, 853 (1959).
343. Bartles v. Livingston, 282 S.C. 448, 464, 319 S.E.2d 707, 716 (Ct. App. 1984)
(citation omitted).
344. Id., 319 S.E.2d at 717 (citation omitted).
345. Id.
346. See, e.g., Southern Welding Works, Inc. v. K & S Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 158, 160,
332 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. Harris-Teeter Supermarkets, Inc., 285 S.C.
445, 447, 330 S.E.2d 316, 317 (Ct. App. 1985); Ramage v. Ramage, 283 S.C. 239, 243-44,
322 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Ct. App. 1984).
347. 298 S.C. at 371, 380 S.E.2d at 839.
348. 299 S.C. 348, 384 S.E.2d 738 (1989).
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not have been charged. '34 9 Without this information "the court is left-
to 'grope in the dark', searching the entire record to ascertain the issue
being raised. '350 Based on Connolly it appears that the supreme court
will continue to strictly enforce rule 4, section 6 despite the court of
appeals' more liberal approach. Accordingly, the decision reached by
the court in Burke may not be similarly reached by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court Rules, however, still require properly framed
exceptions. Thus, the exception should specify in a clear and concise
manner what the lower court did in error and why it was erroneous.
The absence of these necessary elements may jeopardize an otherwise
meritorious appeal.
Susan E. Ziel
XII. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATE DEFENDANT
UPHELD
In Colite Industries, Inc. v. G.W. Murphy Construction Co.351 the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a trial court's decision to dis-
miss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The supreme court
held that the foreign corporate defendant could be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the state's courts because (1) the South Carolina long
arm statute reached the defendant, and (2) the corporation's contacts
were sufficient to satisfy the due process requirements. 52
G.W. Murphy Construction Co. (Murphy), the foreign corporate
defendant, has its primary place of business in Hawaii. Murphy was
connected with a construction project at the Honolulu airport. The
South Carolina plaintiff, Colite Industries, Inc. (Colite), responded to
Murphy's newspaper ad that invited subcontractor's bids. Murphy
hired Colite to supply signs for the airport project. The Murphy-Colite
agreement specified that all "questions regarding the contract [should]
be decided according to the laws of Hawaii; it also specifically incorpo-
rate[d] by reference the applicable laws of any state."35
Colite completed its performance under the contract over a ten-
349. Id. at 352, 384 S.E.2d at 740.
350. Id, (quoting Solley v. Weaver, 247 S.C. 129, 146 S.E.2d 164 (1966)).
351. 297 S.C. 426, 377 S.E.2d 321 (1989).
352. Id. at 428-29, 377 S.E.2d at 322-23.
353. Id. at 427-28, 377 S.E.2d at 322. Arguably, the clause that incorporated the
laws of any state is irrelevant in the context of personal jurisdiction questions. The
clause, however, bound Murphy, and the court viewed it as an important factor to deter-
mine the existence of jurisdiction.
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month period. During that time Murphy twice sent representatives to
Colite's Lexington County, South Carolina facility to review the work
in progress.'" Shortly after the completion of its contract, Colite sued
Murphy and alleged that the company had failed to pay for the ser-
vices. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract action for lack of
personal jurisdiction.3 5 5 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court
stated that jurisdiction may be asserted over a foreign corporate de-
fendant by a South Carolina plaintiff only if (1) the South Carolina
long arm statute applies 56 and (2) the assertion does not exceed con-
stitutional due process limitations.3 57 The court held that the plaintiff
could exercise personal jurisdiction under South Carolina's long arm
statute because the cause of action arose from the defendant's "entry
into a contract to be performed in whole or in part in [South Caro-
lina]." '58 The court stated that when the parties know in advance that
a part of a resident plaintiff's performance will take place in South
Carolina, the long arm statute is satisfied. 59 Murphy made two trips to
South Carolina to check on Colite's progress and, thus, could not dis-
pute that it knew where the contract would be performed.38 0
The court reviewed four factors to decide whether the exercise of
jurisdiction would offend due process. These factors are (1) the dura-
tion of the defendant's activity in the state, (2) the character and cir-
cumstances of the defendant's acts, (3) the burdens on the parties, and
(4) the state's interest in the exercise of jurisdiction.6 1 The court ruled
that the first two factors favored jurisdiction because the defendants
performed the contract over a ten-month period in which the defend-
ant's agents visited South Carolina twice and, thus, made the defend-
ant's contact deliberate.3 8 2 Additionally, the court noted that the con-
tract incorporated by reference the applicable laws of any state so that
Murphy "could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in
South Carolina. 38 3 The court ruled that factors three and four also
supported the exercise of jurisdiction.3 "' It determined that no signifi-
cantly greater inconvenience would result by trying the case in South
354. Id. at 428, 377 S.E.2d at 322.
355. Id. at 426, 377 S.E.2d at 321.
356. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
357. Colite Indus., Inc., 297 S.C. at 428, 377 S.E.2d at 322.
358. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(g) (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
359. Id. The supreme court's Colite opinion establishes a prior knowledge element
for the first time.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 429, 377 S.E.2d at 322.
362. Id.
363. Id. (the court offered no analysis for this holding).
364. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 322-23.
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Carolina rather than in Hawaii. The court also noted that South Caro-
lina had a manifest interest to provide a forum for its citizens. 65
The South Carolina personal jurisdiction test, however, does not
follow the United States Supreme Court. 66 In 1985 the federal law
evolved into its current state with the Court's decision in Burger King
v. Rudzewicz.367 The defendant Rudzewicz, a Michigan accountant, ini-
tially contacted Burger King, a Florida corporation, to a franchise in
his home state. The parties entered into a franchise agreement, and
the contract recited a term of twenty years and stated that Florida law
would control any disputes. Subsequently, Burger King initiated a law-
suit in a Florida federal court to recover Rudzewicz's delinquent
franchise payments. The defendant sought to dismiss the action based
on lack of personal jurisdiction.366 The majority upheld the district
court's exercise of jurisdiction and established a new two-pronged ap-
proach to personal jurisdiction due process questions. Under Burger
King jurisdiction over the person exists when the defendant has at
least minimum contacts with the forum state and the exercise of juris-
diction in that state is reasonable. 3 9 The two prongs have become
known as the power branch and the reasonableness branch.
T0
The Court stated that the power branch may be satisfied when the
element of purposeful direction of activities is present' and the litiga-
tion results from those activities.373 Thus, litigation in the forum state
should have been reasonably anticipated by the foreign defendant.
373
The Court cited five factors in Burger King that contribute to the
determination of reasonableness. These factors are (1) the burden on
the defendant, (2) the adjudication interest of the forum state, (3) the
plaintiff's interest to obtain convenient and effective relief, (4) both
states' interest in efficient dispute resolution, and (5) the states' inter-
est to further substantive social policies.374 The decision also indicated
365. Id.
366. The Supreme Court has considered the due process limits of personal jurisdic-
tion a number of times since 1945. See Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C.L. Rav. 729, 731-87 (1988) (provides a de-
tailed discussion of the line of Supreme Court decisions between 1945 and 1987 on the
due process considerations of personal jurisdiction).
367. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
368. Id. at 464-69.
369. Id. at 476.
370. See Stravitz, supra note 366, at 777.
371. See id. at 778. "[Justice Brennan] apparently used 'directed' rather than
'availed' because 'directed' is more inclusive." Id.
372. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
373. Id. at 474.
374. Id. at 477. These factors were first stated in World-Wide Volkswagon v. Wood-
sen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), but the Court did not rely on them.
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that a strong showing of reasonableness may establish jurisdiction even
when a defendant's contacts with the forum state would be
insufficient.
3 7 5
The Supreme Court applied this two-pronged analysis in the re-
cent case of Asahi Metal Industry, Co. v. Superior Court.376 In that
case, a majority of the Justices concluded that the Japanese corporate
defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with California. The Court
held, however, that the California courts' exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion violated due process because the plaintiff failed to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction377 Thus, the Court has established the
importance of reasonableness in the federal personal jurisdiction due
process calculation.
In South Carolina the supreme court has upheld personal jurisdic-
tion in cases in which the defendants had fewer contacts with the state
than Murphy did in Colite.'7 1 The significance of Colite, however, is
the antiquated analysis recited in the opinion. The court did not men-
tion either Burger King or Asahi in the decision. Furthermore, while
the court did cite International Shoe Co. v. Washington37 9 and World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 80 it applied a test that is unique to
South Carolina to decide the due process issue.3 8 1 Although the test's
four factors incorporate an analysis of minimum contacts and reasona-
bleness, s8 2 an application of these factors to a particular scenario could
yield a different result than the Supreme Court's Burger King analysis.
In Burger King the Supreme Court held that a single act which
creates a "substantial connection" with a forum state is sufficient con-
tact to establish personal jurisdiction.38 3 The first factor of the South
Carolina test, however, looks at the duration of the defendant's acts in
the state and, thus, is significantly more favorable to foreign defend-
375. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477.
376. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Hammond v. Cummins Engine Co., 287 S.C. 200, 336 S.E.2d 867
(1985); Atlantic Soft Drink Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 287 S.C. 228, 336 S.E.2d
876 (1985); Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 270 S.C. 570, 243 S.E.2d 451 (1978).
379. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (established the "minimum contacts" standard).
380. 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (added "foreseeability" to the evaluation of minimum
contacts).
381. The first three factors of the court's test originated in Boney v. Trans-State
Dredging Co., 237 S.C. 54, 115 S.E.2d 508 (1960). The fourth emerged in Parker v. Wil-
liams & Madjanik, Inc., 270 S.C. 570, 243 S.E.2d 451 (1978).
382. The first two factors require the court to evaluate a defendant's contacts with
South Carolina, and the last two factors require the court to evaluate whether it is rea-
sonable to use South Carolina as a forum.
383. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n.18 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
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ants. The effect of the first factor can be balanced by the second factor,
which takes into account the character and circumstances of the de-
fendant's acts in the state. The court, however, failed to indicate in
Colite whether the courts should use a balancing approach, and actu-
ally implied that it did not contemplate courts balancing the first two
factors.38' Furthermore, factors three and four of the state test account
for only three of the five reasonableness considerations the Supreme
Court required in Burger King. The Colite court failed to address the
shared interest of the states in efficient dispute resolution and the fur-
therance of substantive social policies.
The ultimate decision of the court in Colite is a good one based on
the particular facts of the case. The due process analysis used by the
court, however, does not adequately express the current state of juris-
dictional jurisprudence. Thus, this case will be confusing to
practitioners.
Craig N. Killen
384. See Colite Indus., Inc., 297 S.C. at 429, 377 S.E.2d at 322. "A single transaction
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction if [the four] factors are met." Id.
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